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The Case for Individual Audit Partner
Accountability
Colleen Honigsberg*
Despite repeated regulatory interventions, accounting failures continue
to persist in companies around the world. In this Article, I explain why
regulatory oversight, private enforcement, and firm-level reputational sanctions
are unlikely to induce accountants to take optimal levels of care when auditing
corporate financials. Instead, our best chance for improving audit quality lies
in establishing a market for individual audit partners’ brands—a market that
can hold individual auditors responsible for their mistakes.
The Article begins by identifying four key benefits to this approach.
First, forcing auditors to be publicly associated with any audit failures
occurring on their watch will induce them to increase their effort in order to
avoid the stigma of failure. Second, now that a significant portion—frequently
more than half—of audit hours are performed overseas, holding a single
individual publicly accountable for any audit failures will improve monitoring
of auditors in other jurisdictions. Third, in light of significant evidence of
variation in the quality of audit partners—even partners within the same
firm—exposing that heterogeneity will empower members of audit committees
and investors to choose auditors more carefully. Finally, commoditizing
individual auditors could increase industry competition without the need for
aggressive regulatory action.
The Article then argues that, in order to spur the development of a
market in auditor reputation, lawmakers should encourage the development of
Auditor Scorecards. To do so, regulators should require the disclosure of
additional auditor-level information and ensure useful information is provided
through enforcement actions. Although there are costs to these changes, those
costs are likely to be outweighed by giving investors the information they need
to develop a common Scorecard for auditor quality. Such Scorecards will help

*
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boards and investors make better use of the legal tools already at their disposal
to hold auditors accountable when they fail in their gatekeeping function.
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INTRODUCTION
Nearly two decades ago, Congress adopted the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002 to improve the quality of financial reporting. Yet 2018
provided evidence that accounting scandals remain all too common.
From the United States,1 to the United Kingdom,2 to South Africa,3 the
accounting profession saw a series of high-profile audit failures.
Perhaps even more damaging to the integrity of the profession, it was
revealed that KPMG cheated on its regulatory inspections by obtaining
confidential information from its primary U.S. regulator, the Public
Company Accounting Oversight Board (“PCAOB”), leading to a criminal

1.
See Chris Dolmetsch, PwC Ordered to Pay $625 Million in Damages Over Bank’s Audit,
BLOOMBERG (July 2, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-07-02/pwc-ordered-topay-625-million-to-fdic-over-alabama-bank-audit [https://perma.cc/HE7L-NN8V]; see also Press
Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Deloitte & Touche Agrees to Pay $149.5 Million to Settle Claims
Arising From Its Audits of Failed Mortgage Lender Taylor, Bean & Whitaker (Feb. 28, 2018),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/deloitte-touche-agrees-pay-1495-million-settle-claims-arising-itsaudits-failed-mortgage [https://perma.cc/P2NC-9SK7].
2.
See Caitlin Morrison, Carillion Collapse: Who Was Behind the ‘Recklessness, Hubris and
Greed’ that Led to the Demise of the Government Contractor?, INDEPENDENT (May 16, 2018),
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/analysis-and-features/carillion-collapse-latestwho-responsible-richard-adam-howson-philip-green-mp-report-a8353921.html
[https://perma.cc/6X4L-HGJ5] (describing the failure of Carillion and KPMG’s failure to exercise
professional scrutiny); see also Madison Marriage, UK Watchdog Issues Damning Report on PwC’s
Work for BHS, FIN. TIMES (Aug. 15, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/85e00736-a072-11e8-85daeeb7a9ce36e4 [https://perma.cc/668Q-R9JL] (describing the governmental report issued on PwC’s
audit of BHS).
3.
See KPMG South Africa Appeals for Second Chance After Corruption Scandals, REUTERS
(Dec. 10, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/safrica-kpmg/kpmg-south-africa-appeals-forsecond-chance-after-corruption-scandals-idUSL8N1YF1AT [https://perma.cc/RY7E-5YTJ]
(describing KPMG’s faulty audits for VBS Mutual Bank and the Gupta family).
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investigation.4 And these are hardly isolated incidents: from 2005 to
2016, the PCAOB has found that anywhere from 14 to 33% of the audit
opinions it inspected should not have been issued.5 It is time to ask:
Despite the best efforts of Congress, regulators, corporate directors, and
investors, why do significant audit failures persist?
In this Article, I argue that the answer to this question lies in
part in the lack of accountability the law currently provides for
individual auditors. I explain that the incentives provided by regulatory
oversight, private enforcement, and firm-level reputational sanctions
are unlikely to induce socially optimal levels of audit quality. Instead,
individual reputational sanctions are more likely to give audit partners
optimal incentives for care. Thus, lawmakers, corporate fiduciaries, and
investors seeking to improve audit quality should focus on developing a
market in the reputational brands of individual audit partners.
Individual brands are common in financial markets.6 Brokerdealers, for example, provide significant individual disclosure in an
online database known as Brokercheck, and prior work shows that
financial advisors’ career outcomes are profoundly affected by these
disclosures.7 Securities analysts—commonly grouped together with
auditors as gatekeepers—disclose the name of the lead analyst(s)
writing the report, again leading to significant reputational
consequences for individual analysts.8 By contrast, accounting firms
have fought mightily to resist providing market participants with
information about individual auditors.
This Article argues that focusing on individual accountability
would provide four important benefits. First, individual reputation
markets for auditors would cause audit partners to more fully
internalize the costs of an audit failure. Allowing audit partners to
remain anonymous permits them to enjoy a disproportionate portion of
the financial benefits provided by an audit client but share the costs of
failure jointly with other partners of the firm—and those partners are
imperfect monitors of one another’s conduct. Requiring individual
partners to take responsibility for their work will better align incentives
and induce greater levels of effort.
Second, individual accountability will help mitigate a particular
audit risk that has increased over the past decade: the reliance on
4.
See infra Part II.
5.
See Appendix A.
6.
Individual accountability underscores many required disclosures. For a literature review
in this area, see Jeffrey N. Gordon, Executive Compensation: If There’s a Problem, What’s the
Remedy? The Case for “Compensation Discussion and Analysis,” 30 J. CORP. L. 675 (2005).
7.
See infra Part II.
8.
See infra Part I.

4. Honigsberg(Do Not Delete)

2019]

11/16/2019 12:48 PM

INDIVIDUAL AUDIT PARTNER ACCOUNTABILITY

1875

overseas auditors. The limited research on the use of overseas audit
participants suggests that they are associated with increased risk of
audit failure.9 But studies also suggest that holding the lead partner to
a higher level of accountability can, at least in part, counteract the
increased risk by giving domestic partners strong incentives to monitor
overseas work.10
Third, a robust market for individual auditors’ reputation would
make it easier for audit committees and investors to choose higherquality auditors. The evidence shows that there is significant variation
in audit partner quality, even among partners at the same firm.
Knowing this information would allow market participants to demand
higher-quality auditors—while also imposing a penalty on audit
partners who fail to protect investors.
Finally, building individual auditor reputation markets could
increase competition without the need for aggressive regulatory action.
Over 99% of the S&P 500 select one of the Big Four accounting firms,11
and commentators have increasingly taken aim at the oligopolistic
structure of the industry.12 Based on lessons from similar industries,
such as credit and risk analysts, there is reason to believe that
individual reputation markets could increase competition and mobility.
To help market participants develop a robust market for
individual auditor reputation, this Article proposes the use of Auditor
Scorecards that describe publicly available information on the lead
auditor and the audit design for each public company. Such Scorecards
would provide valuable information to the market—but they would be
more informative if regulators mandated disclosure of additional
information that is currently unavailable. First, PCAOB disciplinary
proceedings are not publicly available until years after the infraction,
minimizing their utility. These should be disclosed in a timelier
manner. Second, the current disclosures regarding overseas auditors
are incomplete and should be supplemented. Finally, some enforcement
actions regarding poor audit practices name the auditor, but others do
not. When possible and equitable, the auditor should be named so that
the information can be incorporated in individual reputation markets.

9. See infra notes 133–134 and accompanying text.
10. See infra Part II.
11. John Pakaluk, Auditor Market Share of the S&P 500, AUDIT ANALYTICS (Feb. 27, 2017),
https://blog.auditanalytics.com/auditor-market-share-of-the-sp-500/
[https://perma.cc/55D37UEN].
12. See infra note 162 and accompanying text.
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I. THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF AUDIT OVERSIGHT
Financial misconduct has serious consequences that reverberate
throughout the economy. At a broad economic level, fraud distorts the
allocation of assets, as fraudulent companies receive funding that would
be better allocated elsewhere.13 And companies associated with the
fraudulent company suffer economic setbacks, even if those companies
played no role in the misconduct.14
At an individual level, fraud has serious consequences for
employees and investors. Employees of firms that commit fraud are
more likely to lose their jobs and to receive lower wages if they do retain
their jobs.15 Employees may also lose their retirement savings.
Investors suffer, too. In addition to financial hardship, investors may
suffer from broken relationships, psychological effects, and mental and
physical health problems.16
For these reasons, current law devotes considerable resources to
preventing fraud. A substantial portion of these resources are devoted
to ensuring a strong audit function. Public companies are required to
employ independent auditors, and these auditors are induced to
perform high-quality work through regulatory oversight, private
enforcement, and reputational sanctions. In this Part, I describe the
structural market that provides these incentives.
A. Regulatory Oversight
The PCAOB is the primary audit regulator, but the Securities
and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) also plays a key role. Both
regulators have a multipronged regulatory approach that includes ex
ante monitoring and ex post enforcement. Of the two, the PCAOB plays
a larger monitoring role. Not only does the PCAOB establish auditing
standards, but it ensures compliance with those standards through

13. Simi Kedia & Thomas Philippon, The Economics of Fraudulent Accounting, 22 REV. FIN.
STUD. 2169, 2195 (2009). As an example, consider Theranos, the fraudulent blood-testing company
that received hundreds of millions of dollars from investors. See Reed Abelson, Theranos Founder
Elizabeth Holmes Indicted on Fraud Charges, N.Y. TIMES (June 15, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/15/health/theranos-elizabeth-holmes-fraud.html
[https://perma.cc/MZP6-U4HZ].
14. See Umit G. Gurun, Noah Stoffman & Scott E. Yonker, Trust Busting: The Effect of Fraud
on Investor Behavior, 31 REV. FIN. STUD. 1341, 1344–45 (2018).
15. Jung Ho Choi & Brandon Gipper, Fraudulent Financial Reporting and the Consequences
for Employees 38–39 (Stanford Univ. Graduate Sch. of Bus., Research Paper No. 19-19, 2009),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3346759 [https://perma.cc/7TPN-9WHU].
16. Mark Button, Chris Lewis & Jacki Tapley, Not a Victimless Crime: The Impact of Fraud
on Individual Victims and Their Families, 27 SECURITY J. 36, 42–43 (2014).
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annual inspections of accounting firms.17 In effect, the PCAOB audits
the audit firms. Further, because the PCAOB’s mission is to protect
investors more broadly, the PCAOB also mandates new disclosures
relating to the auditing process that should, in theory, allow investors
to play a greater monitoring role.18
By contrast, although the SEC’s Office of the Chief Accountant
also plays a role in monitoring auditors, the SEC’s regulation of
auditors is generally better known for its ex post enforcement.19 The
SEC can sanction accountants or, in severe cases, bar them from
serving as public company auditors.20 The PCAOB can bring
disciplinary orders as well, but the PCAOB orders tend to concern
inspection-related infractions while SEC actions are more likely to be
brought in instances of fraud.21 Further, PCAOB disciplinary orders can
be appealed to the SEC,22 meaning that the SEC has significant control
over the PCAOB’s enforcement mechanism.
B. Private Enforcement
Under the traditional framework in corporate law, shareholders
(the principal) hire firm managers (the agents). Auditing adds
additional complexity to this model. The shareholders elect the board of
directors, and the board of directors acts through the audit committee
to hire and fire the auditor. Like the board of directors, the auditor
works for the benefit of shareholders. In effect, shareholders are subject
to two agency relationships: one with the audit committee and another
17. Fast Answers: Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE
COMMISSION, https://www.sec.gov/fast-answers/answerspcaobhtm.html (last modified Jan. 16,
2013) [https://perma.cc/MA9R-DF7E].
18. Id.; see also Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 107, 116 Stat. 745, 765–
66 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7217) (new disclosures are subject to SEC approval).
19. Fast Answers, supra note 17. The SEC also oversees the PCAOB. It approves the PCAOB’s
budget, appoints the board members, and must approve certain disciplinary measures, meaning
that the SEC has significant control over the PCAOB. Although the PCAOB and SEC are the
primary auditing regulators, auditors can be targeted by any number of government actors. For
example, the Department of Justice and Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation also bring cases
against auditors.
20. See, e.g., Simcha Baer, CPA, Exchange Act Release No. 82736, 2018 WL 922498 (Feb. 16,
2018) (barring an accountant from appearing or practicing before the Commission as an
accountant).
21. Simi Kedia, Urooj Khan & Shivaram Rajgopal, The SEC’s Enforcement Record Against
Auditors 23 (Feb. 16, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2947469 [https://perma.cc/WJ5Y-8S2H]; see also Joshua Nichols,
Examining Sanctions for Accountants Under SEC Rule of Practice 102(e)(1), VEDDER PRICE 10, 11–
12
(2016),
https://www.vedderprice.com/-/media/files/vedder-thinking/publications/2016/12/
securities-litigation-and-government-enforcement-t.pdf [https://perma.cc/782K-SMNG].
22. Fast Answers, supra note 17.
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with the auditor. This means the shareholders can discipline the
auditor directly (either through litigation or shareholder voting) or
indirectly through the audit committee (through termination).
1. Litigation Against Audit Firms
In theory, the risk of shareholder litigation provides auditors
with a strong incentive to perform high-quality audits. Although
auditors can be sued by any number of parties,23 the incentives created
by shareholder litigation—and the payouts from these cases—are
typically considered most influential.24
In recent years, however, the Supreme Court has increasingly
restricted shareholders’ ability to sue auditors.25 Shareholder litigation
against auditors occurs primarily under the federal securities laws—
typically Rule 10b-5.26 Broadly stated, under Rule 10b-5, actors can be
liable as “primary actors” (those who performed the bad act themselves)
or “secondary actors” (those who assisted the primary actor in her bad
act). Traditionally, secondary actor liability provided a realistic threat
that a poor audit could lead to liability, but auditors were rarely held
liable as primary violators because they typically did not commit the
fraud themselves.
However, beginning with Central Bank of Denver v. First
Interstate Bank of Denver in 199427 and extending through Janus
Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders in 2011, the Court has

23. In addition to shareholders, auditors are frequently sued by, for example, clients, banks,
and insurance companies. Jennifer J. Gaver, Jeffrey S. Paterson & Carl J. Pacini, The Influence of
Auditor State-Level Legal Liability on Conservative Financial Reporting in the Property-Casualty
Insurance Industry, 31 AUDITING, Aug. 2012, at 95, 120; see also Divya Anantharaman, Jeffrey A.
Pittman & Nader Wans, State Liability Regimes Within the United States and Auditor Reporting,
91 ACCT. REV. 1545, 1545–46 (2016).
24. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., The Acquiescent Gatekeeper: Reputational Intermediaries,
Auditor Independence and the Governance of Accounting 6 (Columbia Law Sch. Ctr. for Law &
Econ.
Studies
Working
Paper
No.
191,
2001),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=270944 [https://perma.cc/CC4N-FYVK]; see
also Frank Partnoy, Strict Liability for Gatekeepers: A Reply to Professor Coffee, 84 B.U. L. REV.
365, 370 (2004).
25. Private Securities Fraud Claims Under Section 10(b) Based on False or Misleading
Statements,
SULLIVAN
&
CROMWELL
LLP
3
(2011),
https://www.sullcrom.com/
siteFiles/Publications/SC_Publication_Private_Securities_Fraud_Claims_Under_Section_10b.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6386-FWJA].
26. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2019). Rule 10b-5, promulgated under Section 10(b) of the
Exchange Act, is the broadest antifraud rule under federal securities law. It is the most frequent
shareholder claim brought against auditors. See Colleen Honigsberg et al., The Changing
Landscape of Auditor Litigation 22 (Stanford Law and Econ. Olin Working Paper No. 512, 2019),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3074923
[https://perma.cc/PM2B-269W].
Common law notions of privity prevent most state law claims. See Gaver, supra note 23, at 96.
27 511 U.S. 164 (1994).
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increasingly restricted the scope of secondary actor liability under Rule
10b-5.28 The law now requires shareholder plaintiffs to argue that the
auditor should be liable as a primary actor—a far more difficult feat
than arguing the auditor should be liable as a secondary actor.
Although the Court appeared to step back from the most extreme
limitations of its Janus decision in the more recent Lorenzo v. SEC,29
even a lenient interpretation of Janus imposes significant limitations
on auditor liability.
Perhaps in response to the narrowing of secondary actor liability
under Rule 10b-5, Section 11 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1933
has begun to play an increasing role in shareholder litigation against
auditors.30 However, Section 11 is an imperfect substitute. Not only
does it have a shorter statute of limitations than Rule 10b-5,31 but it
applies only to registration statements (and documents incorporated by
reference).32 By contrast, Rule 10b-5 applies more broadly.
2. Shareholder Voting
Shareholder voting can also provide a check on auditors’ work.
An estimated 80 to 95% of companies request that their shareholders
ratify the company’s auditor.33 These votes are routinely favorable.
According to Audit Analytics, 98% of votes cast from January 1, 2014

28. 564 U.S. 135 (2011); see Honigsberg et al., supra note 26, at 13; infra notes 86–98 and
accompanying text.
29. 139 S. Ct. 1094, 1103 (2019). Justice Clarence Thomas, the author of Janus, wrote a
forceful dissent in Lorenzo, arguing that the majority opinion made no real effort to reconcile its
opinion with Janus. See id. at 1105–11 (Thomas, J., dissenting). However, even if Lorenzo is more
lenient than Janus, it does not seem sufficiently lenient to roll back established precedent for
pleading Rule 10b-5 claims against auditors.
30. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2012). See Honigsberg et al., supra note 26, at 21–22, 53. From 1996–
1998, 91% of securities cases against auditors alleged a violation of Rule 10b-5, and only 28%
alleged a violation of Section 11. By contrast, from 2014–2016, 69% of securities cases against
auditors alleged a violation of Rule 10b-5, and 54% alleged a violation of Section 11. Id.
31. SOX’s extension of the statute of limitations for Rule 10b-5 does not apply to Section 11.
See In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., Nos. 02 Civ.3288 (DLC), 03 Civ.9499 (DLC), 2004 WL
1435356, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. June 28, 2004); see also In re Merrill Lynch & Co. Research Reports Sec.
Litig., 272 F. Supp. 2d 243, 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
32. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k.
33. Cory A. Cassell, Tyler Kleppe & Jonathan E. Shipman, Uninformed Shareholders and the
Efficacy
of
Proxy
Voting
8
(Apr.
6,
2019)
(unpublished
manuscript),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3113807
[https://perma.cc/422Z-VYYT].
Many companies hold a vote on the auditor because it is a “routine” matter supported by
management, meaning that brokers can vote shares without their customers’ direction; as long as
there is at least one such “routine” vote, broker non-votes can be counted towards a quorum. John
Pakaluk, Auditor Ratification: Shareholders Appear Content, AUDIT ANALYTICS BLOG (Oct. 21,
2013),
https://blog.auditanalytics.com/auditor-ratification-shareholders-appear-content/
[https://perma.cc/4MDU-8FTZ].
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through December 31, 2016 were cast in favor of auditor ratification.34
Although such high favorability could indicate satisfaction with the
auditor, these votes are usually considered perfunctory and
uninformed.35
3. Termination
Although the shareholders cannot directly fire the auditor, their
agent (the audit committee) can do so. In theory, the risk of termination
should incentivize auditors to perform high-quality work to keep their
job.36 However, there are significant costs to firing an auditor.37 Indeed,
issuers and auditors tend to have very sticky relationships. For
example, over 175 firms in the S&P 500 have had the same auditor for
over twenty-five years.38 For large public companies, terminating the
company’s auditor is a rare event.
C. Reputational Risk
Alongside regulatory oversight and private enforcement,
reputational risk is thought to provide audit firms—especially large,
34. Jessica McKeon, Auditor Ratification: A Closer Look at Votes Against, AUDIT ANALYTICS
BLOG (Jan. 17, 2017), https://blog.auditanalytics.com/auditor-ratification-a-closer-look-at-votesagainst/ [https://perma.cc/A7JP-AM23].
35. See Cassell, Kleppe & Shipman, supra note 33, at 7.
36. Financial intermediaries usually push companies to hire one of the Big Four/Big Five
auditors, where these are the big audit firms considered to be part of the oligopoly. These firms
are PricewaterhouseCoopers, Ernst & Young, KPMG, Deloitte & Touche, and prior to its demise,
Arthur Andersen (this group is frequently referred to as the Big N because its size was reduced
from the Big Five to the Big Four after the demise of Arthur Andersen). See, e.g., Sadok El Ghoul,
Omrane Guedhami & Jeffrey Pittman, Cross-Country Evidence on the Importance of Big Four
Auditors to Equity Pricing: The Mediating Role of Legal Institutions, 54 ACCT., ORGS. & SOC’Y 60,
68 (2016) (finding that the cost of equity is reduced when an issuer hires a Big N auditor);
Krishnagopal Menon & David D. Williams, Auditor Credibility and Initial Public Offerings, 66
ACCT. REV. 313, 330 (1991) (finding that investment banks push new firms to the large auditors);
Vivien Beattie & Stella Fearnley, Audit Market Competition: Auditor Changes and the Impact of
Tendering, 30 BRITISH ACCT. REV. 261, 276–77 (1998) (finding, based on interviews in the United
Kingdom, that firms switch into the Big N because of the influence of banks or underwriters, the
influence of equity or loan providers, the need for more capacity, the need for a multinational
capability, and just generally the need for a Big N firm (listed in order of descending frequency of
response)). Note that the audit market for issuers is heavily concentrated, but that this contrasts
with the broker-dealer market, where there are thousands of audit firms. See Jonathan Aaron
Cook et al., Auditors Are Known by the Companies They Keep (Univ. of Chi. Booth Sch. of Bus.,
Working Paper No. 19-12, 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3326595
[https://perma.cc/U2JE-FL39].
37. See infra Part II.
38. See David Ingram & Dena Aubin, Insight: Big 4 Auditors Spend More Than Ever on US
Lobbying, REUTERS (Mar. 13, 2012), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-accountingbig4/insight-big-4-auditors-spend-more-than-ever-on-u-s-lobbying-idUSBRE82C0JQ20120313
[https://perma.cc/KX6M-M4Q2].
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successful audit firms—with significant incentives to perform highquality work. Auditors sell their reputation, and theory suggests that
high-quality clients would be unwilling to hire an auditor with a
tarnished reputation.
1. Firm Reputation
Prior research has provided evidence consistent with the
intuition that high-quality clients do not want to be associated with a
low-quality audit firm. For example, large public companies
overwhelmingly employ one of the Big Four audit firms, which are
commonly perceived to be of higher quality. Theoretically, these firms
have more to lose in litigation (they are thought to be attractive
litigation targets because they have relatively deep pockets), and a
sufficiently large client base to resist pressure from a single client.
Some empirical evidence supports the contention that these firms are,
in fact, of higher quality.39
An interesting feature of firm-level auditor reputation in the
United States, however, is that the Big Four appear to enjoy such an
established brand advantage that their reputation is relatively
unaffected by typical audit failures. Although there is some evidence
from abroad that public companies may drop an affiliate of a Big Four
auditor after a high-profile failure,40 this pattern is not present in the
United States.41 As described in Section II.A.2, there are many possible
explanations for the Big Four’s seeming immunity from competition,

39. E.g., Mark DeFond & Jieying Zhang, A Review of Archival Auditing Research, 58 J. ACCT.
& ECON. 275, 299 (2014); Jere R. Francis, Matthew L. Pinnuck & Olena Watanabe, Auditor Style
and Financial Statement Comparability, 89 ACCT. REV. 605, 628 (2014); Denise Dickins et al.,
ICYMI | Not All PCAOB Inspections Are Created Equal, CPA J. (2018),
https://www.cpajournal.com/2018/08/30/icymi-not-all-pcaob-inspections-are-created-equal/
[https://perma.cc/Q7GC-XFW6].
40. See, e.g., Douglas J. Skinner & Suraj Srinivasan, Audit Quality and Auditor Reputation:
Evidence from Japan, 87 ACCT. REV 1737, 1738–39 (2012) (finding that, following a short
suspension, the Japanese affiliate of PwC lost approximately one-quarter of its clients); Joseph
Weber, Michael Willenborg & Jieying Zhang, Does Auditor Reputation Matter? The Case of KPMG
Germany and ComROAD AG, 46 J. ACCT. RES. 941, 944 (2008) (finding an increase in the number
of clients dropping KPMG following a scandal in Germany); Loni Prinsloo & John Bowker, KPMG
Loses More South African Staff from Gupta Fallout, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 26, 2018),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-09-25/kpmg-is-said-to-lose-more-south-africanstaff-from-gupta-fallout [https://perma.cc/Y8HM-S4W8] (describing KPMG’s loss of clients after
the recent Gupta scandal in South Africa).
41. See Kedia, Khan & Rajgopal, supra note 21, at 29. See also Matthew Baugh et al., Did the
2005 Deferred Prosecution Agreement Adversely Impact KPMG’s Tax and/or Audit Practices?, 38
AUDITING, Feb. 2019, at 77, 95 (finding that KPMG’s audit practice was not affected by the legal
challenges its tax practice faced).

4. Honigsberg(Do Not Delete)

1882

11/16/2019 12:48 PM

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72:6:1871

including market pressures, the costs required to get a new auditor up
to speed, and a lack of other options.42
2. Individual Reputation
Finally, in theory, individual reputational risk could induce
high-quality audits. However, to date, auditors have had limited
individual reputational constraints in American markets. With that
being said, research in other securities contexts suggests that
individual reputational constraints can provide powerful incentives to
perform high-quality work.
a. Reputation in Capital Markets
Prior work has shown, for example, that managers who are
present when a firm commits financial misconduct and fail to prevent
it suffer adverse career consequences. Directors are more likely to
depart a firm following earnings restatements or financial fraud,43 and
CEOs have difficulty finding new management roles when they leave
after regulatory enforcement actions are revealed.44 Similarly, financial
advisors, for whom individual detail on prior misconduct is available in
online regulatory databases, suffer negative career consequences upon
committing misconduct.45
Financial analysts, too, are subject to reputation markets.
Beginning in the early 1990s, the Wall Street Journal published a list
of “All-Star Analysts,”46 and significant research has shown that being
42. See infra Section II.A.2.c.
43. Suraj Srinivasan, Consequences of Financial Reporting Failure for Outside Directors:
Evidence from Accounting Restatements and Audit Committee Members, 43 J. ACCT. RES. 291, 331
(2005); see also Hemang Desai, Chris E. Hogan & Michael S. Wilkins, The Reputational Penalty
for Aggressive Accounting: Earnings Restatements and Management Turnover, 81 ACCT. REV. 83,
108 (2006); Karen M. Hennes, Andrew J. Leone & Brian P. Miller, The Importance of
Distinguishing Errors from Irregularities in Restatement Research: The Case of Restatements and
CEO/CFO Turnover, 83 ACCT. REV. 1487, 1515, 1517 (2008).
44. Eliezer M. Fich & Anil Shivdasani, Financial Fraud, Director Reputation, and
Shareholder Wealth, 86 J. FIN. ECON. 306, 307 (Nov. 2007).
45. See Mark Egan, Gregor Matvos & Amit Seru, The Market for Financial Adviser
Misconduct, 127 J. POL. ECON. 233, 261–71 (2019) (showing that advisors are more likely to depart
their firm after misconduct and have a slightly worse prospect of reemployment than advisors with
no instances of misconduct; and those who find employment with a new firm are, on average, likely
to land a less prestigious employment); see also Colleen Honigsberg & Matthew Jacob, Deleting
Misconduct: The Expungement of Brokercheck Records (Nov. 14, 2018) (unpublished manuscript),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3284738
[https://perma.cc/87ES-2QNQ]
(showing that brokers with successful expungements have better career outcomes).
46. Looking Back at the Best on the Street, WALL ST. J. (May 9, 2012, 11:51 AM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304811304577370093584392220#7
[https://perma.cc/Y999-AD3H]; see also John R. Dorfman, Sixteen All-Stars Excel for the Fifth
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on that list is associated with substantial professional rewards. One
study found that Star Analysts were more likely to move to the buy side
following industry turmoil.47 Another found that Star Analysts earn
61% more than unrated peers.48 And another found that Star Analysts
enjoyed increased job mobility following regulatory reform.49 Because
analysts, like auditors, are commonly considered gatekeepers, research
on analyst reputation markets may be especially relevant for
lawmakers considering how to improve audit outcomes.50
b. Reputation Markets in the Auditing Industry
By comparison, accounting firms have successfully resisted rules
that would produce public disclosure of individual auditor information,
allowing audit partners to hide behind their firms’ reputations.51 The
resulting incentives have a concerning implication for investors: each
individual partner is incentivized to accommodate firm managers, even
at the expense of audit quality.
To see why, consider the following. Audit partners’
compensation is significantly determined by whether they maintain or
increase their client base.52 Further, many Big Four partners leave to
work in industry.53 Therefore, each partner’s principal objectives are to
keep her clients and to appease potential future clients and employers.
Relative to the firm, each partner will receive a disproportionate share
Time,
WALL
S T.
J.
(June
19,
1997),
https://www.wsj.com/public/current/articles/SB866661569251491500.htm
[https://perma.cc/EXK8-ML6C].
47. Yuyan Guan, Hai Lu & M.H. Franco Wong, Regulations and Brain Drain: Evidence from
the Wall Street Star Analysts’ Career Choices 24 (Jan. 2013) (unpublished manuscript),
http://www-2.rotman.utoronto.ca/facbios/file/GLW_Jan28_2013_fullversion.pdf
[https://perma.cc/65KZ-PF35].
48. Boris Groysberg, Paul M. Healy & David A. Maber, What Drives Sell-Side Analyst
Compensation at High-Status Investment Banks?, 49 J. ACCT. RES. 969, 971 (2011).
49. See Yuyan Guan et al., Regulations and Brain Drain: Evidence from Wall Street Star
Analysts’
Career
Choices,
MGMT.
SCI.
(forthcoming)
(manuscript
at
27),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3243135 [https://perma.cc/8GHA-Q9X9].
50. Of course, the comparison is not identical—analysts succeed by making accurate
predictions; auditors succeed by preventing failure (a relatively binary outcome).
51. Barring relatively infrequent instances, the name of the partner conducting the audit has
historically been confidential, so the reputational focus is on the firm or firm office.
52. W. Robert Knechel, Lasse Niemi & Mikko Zerni, Empirical Evidence on the Implicit
Determinants of Compensation in Big 4 Audit Partnerships, 51 J. ACCT. RES. 349, 350, 376–78
(2013) (analyzing Big Four compensation in Sweden); see also Paul J. Coram & Matthew J.
Robinson, Professionalism and Performance Incentives in Accounting Firms, 31 ACCT. HORIZONS
103, 105, 118–19 (2017) (examining Big Four compensation in Australia).
53. See Anne Albrecht, Elaine G. Mauldin & Nathan J. Newton, Do Auditors Recognize the
Potential Dark Side of Executives’ Accounting Competence?, ACCT. REV., Nov. 2018, at 1, 9 (finding
that 18.2% of firms between 2004 and 2013 had at least one executive with either audit manager
or audit partner experience).
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of the fees paid by that client—and other potential benefits in the form
of non–Big Four employment. However, because the market will not
know the partner’s identity—only that of her firm and perhaps her
associated office—she will share the risk of an audit failure jointly with
other partners at her same firm.
Recognizing this problem, in 2009 the PCAOB proposed
mandating disclosure of the individual audit partner leading public
company audits.54 The accounting industry strongly opposed the
disclosure, arguing that it would significantly increase their risk of
litigation for little benefit.55 For example, they argued that the
disclosure could increase their risk of Section 11 liability (a claim the
SEC disputed).56 The firms also argued that the disclosure could
increase their risk of Rule 10b-5 liability and/or cause individual
auditors to be named in lawsuits.57
In response to concerns of increased litigation risk, in December
2015, the PCAOB adopted a new rule that required disclosure of the
audit partner in a different format.58 The new PCAOB Form AP,
Auditor Reporting of Certain Audit Participants, would be filed on the
PCAOB’s website rather than with the issuer’s filings—that is, the
name of the engagement partner would not be disclosed in the audit
report, but in an entirely separate location. The SEC approved the rules
requiring Form AP in May 2016,59 and audit firms became required to
file the form in conjunction with audit reports issued on or after
January 31, 2017.60
It is too soon to know the effect of the disclosure (if any). The
initial research is split on its effect, with some studies suggesting that
54. PUB. CO. ACCOUNTING OVERSIGHT BD., RELEASE NO. 2009-005, CONCEPT RELEASE ON
REQUIRING THE ENGAGEMENT PARTNER TO SIGN THE AUDIT REPORT 7–8 (2009),
https://pcaobus.org/Rulemaking/Docket029/2009-07-28_Release_No_2009-005.pdf
[https://perma.cc/L6GN-JX6J].
55. PUB. CO. ACCOUNTING OVERSIGHT BD., RELEASE NO. 2015-004, SUPPLEMENTAL REQUEST
FOR COMMENT: RULES TO REQUIRE DISCLOSURE OF CERTAIN AUDIT PARTICIPANTS ON A NEW
PCAOB FORM 4 (2015), https://pcaobus.org/Rulemaking/Docket029/Release_2015_004.pdf
[https://perma.cc/P34J-F4F7].
56. See Order Granting Approval of Proposed Rules to Require Disclosure of Certain Audit
Participants on a New PCAOB Form and Related Amendments to Auditing Standards, Exchange
Act Release No. 34-77787, at 6–7 (May 9, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/rules/pcaob/2016/3477787.pdf [https://perma.cc/FMK4-TMXR] [hereinafter Order Granting Approval of Proposed
Rules] (discussing the concern over increased liability and the PCAOB’s response).
57. PUB. CO. ACCOUNTING OVERSIGHT BD., supra note 55, at 4–5.
58. News Release, Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., PCAOB Adopts Rules Requiring
Disclosure
of
the
Engagement
Partner
(Dec.
15,
2015),
https://pcaobus.org/News/Releases/Pages/PCAOB-adopts-disclosure-rules-Form-AP-12-1515.aspx [https://perma.cc/N8V6-UWD3].
59. See Order Granting Approval of Proposed Rules, supra note 56.
60. Id.
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it may have increased audit quality (and audit fees), and other work
finding no effect.61 As a practical matter, however, the name of the audit
partner seems unlikely to provide investors with significant
information until those investors know more about that individual
through, for example, Auditor Scorecards.
II. THE CASE FOR INDIVIDUAL AUDITOR REPUTATION
In this Part, I note that existing deterrence mechanisms have
failed to produce optimal audit quality. Then, I describe the arguments
for and against individual auditor reputation markets. In favor, I note
that the existing deterrence mechanisms are ineffective, and that
individual brands would improve audit quality by realigning the
incentives of the auditor, improving the ability of audit committees and
investors to select a high-quality auditor, and arguably increasing
competition. However, I note potential objections such as the
possibilities of increased audit fees, litigation, and/or risk aversion.
A. Existing Deterrence Mechanisms
In evaluating the effectiveness of existing mechanisms, it is
important to distinguish the optimal failure rate for audit “outcomes”
(for example, restatements) from the optimal failure rate for audit
“inputs” (for example, failing to perform the audit in accordance with
auditing standards). The optimal failure of inputs should be far lower
than the optimal failure of outcomes and close to zero. After all, auditing
standards are adopted after a rigorous review process and are designed
to balance the need for cost-effective audits with the need to prevent
audit failure outcomes.
The best evidence of the quality of audit inputs comes from
PCAOB inspections. Figure 1 shows the frequency of “not sufficient”
audits uncovered by the PCAOB during their inspections. An audit is
deemed not sufficient if the PCAOB believed the auditor lacked
sufficient evidence to issue an opinion (stated simply, an audit is
deemed not sufficient if the PCAOB believes the auditor did not follow

61. Compare Lauren Cunningham, Chan Li, Sarah E. Stein & Nicole Wright, What’s in a
Name? Initial Evidence of U.S. Audit Partner Identification Using Difference-in-Differences
Analyses, 94 ACCT. REV. 139 (2019) (finding no significant increase in audit fees and/or audit
quality on average), with Jenna Burke, Rani Hoitash & Udi Hoitash, Audit Partner Identification
and Characteristics: Evidence from U.S. Form AP Filings, 38 AUDITING, Aug. 2019 (finding a
significant increase in audit fees and audit quality in the first year after adoption). See also infra
Part II (discussing other recent research).
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auditing standards). From 2005 to 2016, the number of “not sufficient”
audits ranged from 14 to 33% with no discernable trend.62

Total Number of Audits

FIGURE 1: PCAOB INSPECTIONS, 2005 TO 2016
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These are striking statistics. Although the sample of audits
selected for inspection is not randomly chosen and likely to be more
problematic than the full set of audits,63 a finding that, on average, 25%
of audit opinions inspected should not have been issued cannot be
optimal. Further, the lack of a decline is notable, as it suggests that
firms are not learning from the PCAOB’s inspection process.64 These

62. See Appendix A. As an example of an audit lacking sufficient evidence, consider the
PCAOB’s 2014 inspection report for MaloneBailey. The issuer in question recognized full revenue
upon the customer’s acceptance of delivery despite the fact that the contracts indicated the issuer
had ongoing obligations beyond delivery. Under basic accounting principles, revenue should be
recognized when earned. If the issuer has not fulfilled all obligations of the contract, it cannot
recognize full revenue. This basic tenet was not followed, and the PCAOB noted there was no
evidence in the audit documentation that the auditor had performed standard procedures to
determine whether the issuer’s revenue recognition was correct. PUB. CO. ACCOUNTING OVERSIGHT
BD.,
2013
INSPECTION
OF
MALONEBAILEY,
LLP
5–6
(2014),
https://pcaobus.org/Inspections/Reports/Documents/2015_MaloneBailey_LLP.pdf
[https://perma.cc/QNS9-CMWF].
63. The PCAOB conducts risk-based inspections, meaning that it uses internally developed
factors to predict audit failure and weighs the predicted failure rates when selecting audits to
inspect. However, the PCAOB must inspect the eleven accounting firms with more than one
hundred issuers annually, while accounting firms with fewer than one hundred issuers are
generally inspected triennially. As such, the inspections are risk-based, conditional on the firms
subject to inspection. Therefore, the audits inspected are often considered to disproportionately
represent large issuers in complex industries that have experienced prior accounting failures.
64. These trends are not limited to the United States. European regulators also find high
failure rates in the audits they inspect. See John C. Coffee, Why Do Auditors Fail? What Might
Work? What Won’t? (Columbia Law Sch. Ctr. for Law & Econ. Studies, Working Paper No. 597,
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findings lead us to question why the existing deterrence methods
described above do not induce better behavior.
1. Regulatory Authorities
Despite the reforms imposed by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
(“SOX”), there remain several reasons to expect regulation to provide
suboptimal levels of deterrence. First, there is evidence that accounting
regulators suffer from regulatory capture. Second, lobbying by
accounting firms has successfully deterred and/or eliminated regulation
meant to incentivize high-quality audits. Third, following the collapse
of Arthur Andersen, regulators have been reluctant to impose penalties
that could further reduce the size of the accounting market.
a. Regulatory Capture at the PCAOB
Stated broadly, regulatory capture is the process through which
special interests infiltrate the regulatory process and advance their own
interests at the public’s expense.65 When capture occurs, the regulatory
process is upended and becomes ineffective.
Capture can occur for many reasons. However, in financial
services, a common explanation for capture is that regulators cater to
the entities they are supposed to regulate in order to receive lucrative
job offers from those entities upon leaving the regulatory organization.66
To mitigate these concerns, the PCAOB is limited to two CPAs on its
board of five members.67
Nonetheless, capture remains a concern. A recent study found
that accounting firms with worse PCAOB inspection results hire more

2019), https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/2293/ [https://perma.cc/V2T53WXM].
65. For example, an industry might propose rules that restrict entrance into a market, thus
benefitting the existing players. See, e.g., Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, The Politics of
Government Decision-Making: A Theory of Regulatory Capture, 106 Q.J. ECON. 1089 (1991); Sam
Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. & ECON. 211 (1976); George J.
Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971).
66. For example, “between 2006 and 2010, 219 former SEC employees filed 789 postemployment statements indicating their intent to represent an outside client before the
Commission.” PROJECT ON GOV’T OVERSIGHT, REVOLVING REGULATORS: SEC FACES ETHICS
CHALLENGES WITH REVOLVING DOOR 2 (2011), http://pogoarchives.org/m/fo/revolving-regulators20110513.pdf [https://perma.cc/3NBJ-QRS9].
67. Lewis H. Ferguson, Board Member, Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., Remarks on
Investor
Protection
Through
Audit
Oversight
(Sept.
21,
2012),
https://pcaobus.org/News/Speech/Pages/09212012_FergusonCalState.aspx
[https://perma.cc/4UJR-299G].
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PCAOB employees into senior-level positions68—after which inspection
results improve. Although this could reflect an improvement in audit
quality, the authors found no change in the frequency of restatements
or SEC enforcement actions; the improvement was limited to inspection
findings.69
With this in mind, the facts cited in the Department of Justice
(“DOJ”) indictment against former KPMG and PCAOB employees bear
mention.70 Relative to the other Big Four firms, KPMG scored poorly on
its PCAOB audit inspections. To improve its performance, it hired
former PCAOB employees and demanded that these employees provide
confidential PCAOB data detailing the audits to be inspected. These
newly hired KPMG employees complied, stealing confidential
information on their way out the door and wringing further confidential
information out of a former colleague at the PCAOB after they had
exited.
The result was that KPMG cheated on its PCAOB inspections
for years. By obtaining the list of audits to be inspected, KPMG
essentially had the answers to the exam in advance. Two defendants
have already pled guilty, two were convicted at trial, and two still face
ongoing charges.71
b. Lobbying Efforts of the Big Four
Lobbying, too, has limited the effectiveness of regulatory
authorities. A Reuters report found that the Big Four spent $9.4 million
on in-house and outside lobbyists in 201272—a figure that has steadily
68. Bradley E. Hendricks, Wayne R. Landsman & F. Dimas Pena-Romera, The Revolving
Door Between the PCAOB and Large Audit Firms 2, 5 (May 2018) (unpublished manuscript),
https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/sites/gsb/files/acct_05_18_hendricks.pdf
[https://perma.cc/WBG8DYER].
69. Id. at 26.
70. Press Release No. 18-023, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 5 Former KPMG Executives and PCAOB
Employees Charged in Manhattan Federal Court for Fraudulent Scheme to Sell Valuable and
Confidential PCAOB Information and Use that Information to Fraudulently Improve KPMG
Inspection Results (Jan. 23, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/5-former-kpmgexecutives-and-pcaob-employees-charged-manhattan-federal-court-fraudulent
[https://perma.cc/X6MQ-79ZQ]; Press Release No. 19-075, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Former KPMG
Executive and Former PCAOB Employee Convicted of Wire Fraud for Scheme to Steal and Use
Confidential PCAOB Information (Mar. 11, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/formerkpmg-executive-and-former-pcaob-employee-convicted-wire-fraud-scheme-steal-and
[https://perma.cc/RY5A-R6ZJ].
71. See Press Release No. 18-023, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 70 (stating that five
defendants were charged and a sixth pled guilty); Press Release No. 19-075, U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
supra note 70 (noting that two of the original five charged were convicted). The cases against the
remaining defendants are ongoing.
72. Ingram & Aubin, supra note 38. See also Richard L. Cassin, Ex-KPMG Partner Pleads
Guilty in PCAOB Cheating Scandal, THE FCPA BLOG (Oct. 7, 2019, 1:38 PM),
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increased over time.73 Another report stated that accountants are “in
the same category of more established big donors like telephone
companies, higher education and the building trade unions.”74
This money comes with strings. Accounting firms have
successfully deterred and/or eliminated regulation that, in theory,
would incentivize high-quality audits. For example, despite multiple
bills by members of Congress75 and pushes by PCAOB members,76
PCAOB disciplinary proceedings are currently nonpublic. The
proceedings only become public after a settlement or when litigation is
complete (including the completion of any appeals).77 These restrictions
prevent investors from learning of infractions in a timely manner.78

https://fcpablog.com/2019/10/07/ex-kpmg-partner-pleads-guilty-in-pcaob-cheating-scandal/
[https://perma.cc/8QFF-VWGK].
73. See Ingram & Aubin, supra note 38. (“Even going back to 1999, the earliest year for which
online reports are available, annual spending by the industry, including the now-defunct Arthur
Andersen, was lower than last year’s.”).
74. Stephen Labaton, Enron’s Collapse: The Lobbying; Auditing Firms Exercise Power in
Washington, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 19, 2002), https://www.nytimes.com/2002/01/19/business/enron-scollapse-the-lobbying-auditing-firms-exercise-power-in-washington.html [https://perma.cc/V47EL6SF].
75. See Laura Tieger Salisbury, Senators Revive Bill to Make PCAOB Disciplinary Actions
Public, BLOOMBERG L. (Mar. 21, 2017, 6:34 PM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/corporatelaw/senators-revive-bill-to-make-pcaob-disciplinary-actions-public
[https://perma.cc/AT6FWVVW]; Robert Schmidt & Anthony Capaccio, Is Your Auditor Being Investigated? New Law May
Expose
Misdeeds,
BLOOMBERG
NEWS
(Feb.
4,
2019,
3:00
AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-02-04/is-your-auditor-being-investigated-newlaw-may-expose-misdeeds [https://perma.cc/3VR5-HGSB].
76. See, e.g., Claudius B. Modesti, Dir. of Enf’t, Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., Speech at
the New York State Society of CPAs’ SEC Conference: The Need for Transparency in PCAOB
Disciplinary Proceedings (Sept. 28, 2010), https://pcaobus.org/News/Speech/Pages/09282010_
ModestiTransparency.aspx [https://perma.cc/35QL-LFFM] (discussing a proposed amendment to
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 to make PCOAB disciplinary proceedings public).
77. 15 U.S.C. § 7215(d) (2012). The proceedings are only made public prior to completion if
the PCAOB finds good cause to make them public and all parties consent to making them public.
15 U.S.C. § 7215(c)(2); see also Modesti, supra note 76 (“Right now, the PCAOB is virtually unique
among similar regulators in that our disciplinary proceedings are required by law to be kept
confidential through charging, hearings, initial decision, and even appeal.”).
78. Press Release, Chuck Grassley, U.S. Senator for Iowa, Reed and Grassley Seek to
Increase
Transparency
at
Accounting
Watchdog
(Nov.
18,
2011),
https://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/news-releases/reed-and-grassley-seek-increasetransparency-accounting-watchdog [https://perma.cc/T4D3-UHPD]. As another example of the Big
Four’s lobbying influence, the PCAOB previously pushed for mandatory rotations of the audit firm,
as opposed to only a mandatory rotation of the audit partner—a change that the Big Four opposed.
The change never materialized. Vincent Ryan, PCAOB Abandons Auditor Rotation, CFO (Feb. 6,
2014),
http://www.cfo.com/auditing/2014/02/pcaob-abandons-auditor-rotation/
[https://perma.cc/8V8J-PT55].
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c. Reluctance to Reduce the Size of the Accounting Market
After Arthur Andersen’s collapse reduced the Big Five to the Big
Four, regulators have been handicapped in imposing severe penalties
because they are hesitant to cause the collapse of another large
accounting firm—and therefore further reduce competition. For
example, in 2005, the DOJ filed tax fraud charges against eight
partners at KPMG.79 The misconduct was egregious. In addition to tax
fraud, there was strong evidence that KMPG itself was guilty of
obstruction.80
Documents released from the negotiations between the DOJ and
KPMG indicate that there were discussions about whether any
agreement would “put KPMG under” or “kill” the firm.81 In sum, KPMG
feared that if it were put under federal indictment like Arthur
Andersen, it would be unable to survive. In the end, the DOJ charged
eight partners with tax fraud and required the firm to pay $456 million
in penalties, but KPMG itself was spared from a potentially lethal
criminal indictment.82
In KPMG’s most recent example of bad behavior—when it
cheated on its PCAOB inspections—the firm was spared again.
Although the DOJ brought criminal charges against individual
employees for their role in helping KPMG cheat on its PCAOB audit
inspections, KPMG itself was not indicted.83 As in the 2005 scandal,
regulators were hesitant to bring charges against the firm for fear of
reducing the Big Four to the Big Three.84 This concern reduces
79. Jonathan D. Glater, 8 Former Partners of KPMG Are Indicted, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 30, 2005),
https://www.nytimes.com/2005/08/30/business/8-former-partners-of-kpmg-are-indicted.html
[https://perma.cc/CBZ8-ERMD].
80. See John R. Wilke, KPMG Faces Indictment Risk on Tax Shelters, WALL ST. J. (June 16,
2005, 12:01 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB111888827431261200 [https://perma.cc/Q5M2ZEYL] (“KPMG tried for years to delay or conceal evidence behind misleading and sometimes false
claims of legal privilege.”).
81. Francine McKenna, US Department of Justice v KPMG: Document Shows “Too Few To
Fail”
Was
Opening
Premise,
RE:
THE
AUDITORS
(Apr.
19,
2014),
http://retheauditors.com/2014/04/19/us-department-of-justice-v-kpmg-document-shows-too-fewto-fail-was-opening-premise/ [https://perma.cc/BER8-3E6N].
82. Press Release No. 05-433, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, KPMG to Pay $456 Million for Criminal
Violations in Relation to Largest-Ever Tax Shelter Fraud Case (Aug. 29, 2005)
https://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2005/August/05_ag_433.html
[https://perma.cc/H85P2NM9].
83. See Press Release No. 18-023, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 70 (discussing charges
against former KPMG executives and PCAOB employees); Press Release No. 19-075, U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, supra note 70 (discussing convictions of a former KPMG executive and PCAOB employee).
84. See Jonathan Weil, Nine are Charged in KPMG Case on Tax Shelters, WALL ST. J. (Aug.
30, 2005), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB112533172910025699 [https://perma.cc/7Z54-6BJ7]
(“Attorney General Alberto Gonzales said the Justice Department weighed ‘collateral
consequences’ in deciding not to indict KPMG . . . .”).
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regulators’ negotiating leverage. Further, by taking the death penalty
off the table, regulators cannot bring charges that may be deserved.
In sum, there are reasons to expect suboptimal government
regulation of accounting firms. First, regulatory capture can impede
regulatory effectiveness. Second, through lobbying, accounting firms
have thwarted policies that would have theoretically induced higherquality audits. Third, regulators are handicapped in imposing
penalties, as they do not want to reduce the Big Four to the Big Three.
2. Private Enforcement
Private enforcement, which could come in the form of litigation,
shareholder voting, and/or termination, is also unlikely to be an
effective deterrent. First, it is unclear whether litigation risk improves
audit quality. Further, even if it does improve audit quality, auditors’
litigation risk has declined significantly over the past two decades.
Second, shareholders are unlikely to provide meaningful input on the
company’s auditor unless they have additional information that, under
the current regime, is not provided. Third, issuers face such significant
costs for terminating an auditor that termination is an infrequent
event—thus limiting the incentive created by this threat.
a. Litigation Against Audit Firms
Empirical literature is mixed on whether litigation risk serves
to improve audit quality. There is a consensus that auditors mitigate
litigation risk by, for example, charging higher fees and issuing more
going-concern opinions,85 but it is unclear that these strategies improve
audit quality. Increased audit fees could be consistent with greater
effort or with auditor rents. Similarly, an increase in going-concern
opinions could be consistent with increased audit quality and greater
conservativism, or with increased risk aversion to the detriment of
accuracy.
Further, even if we believe that litigation risk improves audit
quality, litigation is no longer the threat it once was. Shareholder
litigation has traditionally represented the biggest litigation risk for

85. If the auditor has substantial doubt that the issuer will continue to survive in the future
(defined as the following year), the auditor must issue a “going-concern qualification” indicating
that the auditor questions the company’s ability to continue as an operating company. For an
overview of research on the relationship between litigation risk and audit quality, see DeFond &
Zhang, supra note 39.
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auditors. However, shareholder litigation against auditors has declined
significantly over the past decades.86
Figure 2, below, shows the number of shareholder class action
lawsuits against auditor defendants over each three-year period from
1996 through 2016 (the data end in June 2016), along with the
proportion of those defendants from the “Big Four/Five” accounting
firms.87 Only litigation brought by shareholders in federal court
alleging violations of federal law is included.88

Number of Lawsuits

FIGURE 2: NUMBER OF SHAREHOLDER CLASS ACTION LAWSUITS
AGAINST AUDITOR DEFENDANTS, 1996 TO 2016
160
140
120
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40
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Year Range

Num. Auditor Defendants

Num. Big 4/5 Defendants

As shown, the frequency of litigation filings has declined since
its peak at the turn of the century, especially against the biggest
accounting firms. Shareholders brought only twenty-eight class actions
against auditors from 2012 to June 2016, and most of these auditor
defendants were non–Big Four.

86. See Honigsberg et al., supra note 26, at 30 (finding a decline in Rule 10b-5 liability
exposure for auditors since the PLSRA and particularly following Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First
Derivative Traders, 564 U.S. 135 (2011), even after controlling for changes in audit quality).
87. The Big Four audit firms include PricewaterhouseCoopers, Deloitte & Touche, KPMG,
and Ernst & Young. Prior to its demise, Arthur Andersen was part of this select clique (known as
the “Big Five”). The figure includes Arthur Andersen in the years prior to its demise.
88. Shareholder litigation against auditors occurs almost exclusively in federal courts under
federal securities laws. See Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105353, 112 Stat. 3227 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.); Cyan, Inc. v. Beaver
Cty. Emps. Ret. Fund, 138 S. Ct. 1061, 1067–68 (2018). As noted above, common law notions of
privity prevent shareholder litigation against auditors in most states, and federal law requires
that most class action lawsuits brought under federal securities laws must be in federal court.
Honigsberg et al., supra note 26.

4. Honigsberg(Do Not Delete)

2019]

11/16/2019 12:48 PM

INDIVIDUAL AUDIT PARTNER ACCOUNTABILITY

1893

Figures 3 and 4 examine other important trends in litigation
against auditors: dismissal rates and settlement values. Figure 3 shows
that, as a percentage of the number of lawsuits alleging a violation of
Rule 10b-5, dismissals of those claims have increased (where dismissals
are defined as a dismissal of a Rule 10b-5 claim with prejudice or a
dismissal without prejudice but the plaintiff declines to amend). For
summary purposes, Figure 3 presents average dismissal rates over each
three-year period.

Dismissal Rate

FIGURE 3: DISMISSAL RATES FOR RULE 10b-5 CLAIMS BROUGHT BY
SHAREHOLDERS AGAINST AUDITORS, 1996 TO 2016
80%
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Figure 4 presents settlement values over each three-year period.
Total payouts are presented as black bars, and the auditor payout as a
percentage of the total payout by all defendants is presented as a dotted
line (note that some cases in the final time periods remain ongoing). In
terms of total payouts, settlements peaked at the turn of the century
and have significantly declined thereafter. Relative to total payouts by
defendants in the same cases, auditor settlements were highest in
1996–1998 (17%) and have remained relatively constant since (5%–7%).
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FIGURE 4: SETTLEMENT VALUES IN CLASS ACTION LAWSUITS AGAINST
AUDITORS, 1996 TO 2016
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Total Settlement Paid by Auditor Defendant
Auditor Settlement Relative to Total Settlements

One explanation for the decline in auditor litigation is that audit
quality has improved—that is, perhaps auditors perform better and
there are fewer reasons to sue them. However, further analysis shows
that the decline is robust to controls for improvements in audit quality.
For example, the most consistently significant determinant for
successful litigation against auditors is whether there is a
restatement.89 However, over the period from 2002 to 2016, auditors
became less likely to be sued following a severe restatement (defined as
a restatement of 10% or more of net income).90 As such, although audit
quality may be a factor, it cannot explain the decline in full.
There are other possible explanations for the decline.91 One
explanation that I offered in prior work is the Supreme Court’s
narrowing of secondary actor liability. Indeed, the decline in litigation
89. Dain C. Donelson & Robert A. Prentice, Scienter Pleading and Rule 10b-5: Empirical
Analysis and Behavioral Implications, 63 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 441, 484–86 (2012).
90. See Honigsberg et al., supra note 26, at 29 (finding a decline in the likelihood that auditors
will face lawsuits following severe restatements between 2002 and 2016).
91. One possible explanation is that plaintiffs were less likely to have the benefit of an SEC
enforcement action to help with pleading because the SEC brought fewer auditing-related
enforcement actions after the creation of the PCAOB. Another possible explanation is that a
reduction in auditor-provided nonaudit services hampered plaintiffs’ ability to plead scienter. See
Jamie J. Schmidt, Perceived Auditor Independence and Audit Litigation: The Role of Nonaudit
Services Fees, 87 ACCT. REV. 1033, 1060 (2012).
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following a restatement is largely driven by the years following Janus,92
an empirical trend consistent with the legal effects of Janus.
Prior to Janus, the law stated that auditors needed to “make” a
statement to be liable as a primary actor under Rule 10b-5, but circuits
disagreed on what it meant to make a statement.93 Some circuits
imposed a strict requirement that the auditor make the false or
misleading statement, but other circuits allowed the auditor to be liable
for the issuer’s misconduct if the auditor had “substantially assisted”
the issuer’s misconduct by, for example, proposing accounting
treatments.94 In essence, the circuits differed on whether plaintiffs had
to meet each element of Rule 10b-5 based entirely on the audit report
(relatively boilerplate language stating that the auditor reviewed the
company’s financials and found them to be in compliance), or whether
plaintiffs could rely on other aspects of the auditor’s behavior in stating
a claim.95
In Janus, the Court endorsed an auditor-friendly requirement
that an actor must have “ultimate authority” over a statement to
“make” the statement and therefore be subject to primary liability.96 As
a practical matter, this means shareholders suing auditors under Rule
10b-5 will have to state a claim based on the audit report alone97—a
significant uphill battle for plaintiffs, who tend to have difficulty
alleging elements such as scienter based solely on the audit report.98
92. See Honigsberg et al., supra note 26, at 29 (“[T]he likelihood the auditor will be sued is
roughly two percentage points lower following Janus.”).
93. Browning Jeffries, The Implications of Janus on Issuer Liability in Jurisdictions Rejecting
Collective Scienter, 43 SETON HALL L. REV. 491, 499–509 (2013).
94. See Honigsberg et al., supra note 26, at 15–16. The Second, Fifth, Eighth, Tenth, and
Eleventh Circuits generally followed the “bright-line” standard (the more stringent standard), but
the Fourth and Ninth Circuits followed the “substantial participation” test (the looser standard).
Id.
95. See id. (noting differences between tests applied among circuits, namely whether
plaintiffs were required to demonstrate 10b-5 liability solely from the audit report or whether
plaintiffs could point to an auditor’s “substantial participation” in the fraud).
96. Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 564 U.S. 135, 142 (2011).
97. In a review of cases in the Fourth and Ninth Circuits filed post-Dura and pre-Janus and
alleging the auditor violated Rule 10b-5, more than half alleged that the auditor was liable based
on its substantial participation in the issuer’s misstatement (these are the two circuits that
allowed evidence of the auditor’s substantial participation to be considered). By contrast, in the
five years after Janus, all complaints argued the auditor was liable based solely on the audit
report.
98. See Scott v. ZST Dig. Networks, Inc., No. CV 11-03531 GAF, 2012 WL 538279 (C.D. Cal.
Feb. 14, 2012). ZST Digital Networks was required to file financial statements with U.S. and
Chinese securities regulators. The filings were vastly different; ZST showed a profit in the U.S.
filings and a loss in the Chinese filings. The differences extended beyond different accounting rules
in place in the different countries to reflect differences in the business fundamentals. Despite the
plaintiff’s arguments that the auditor was reckless in providing a clean audit opinion in the U.S.
filings when the Chinese filings were vastly different, the court declined to find that the plaintiff
had properly pled scienter.
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In sum, it appears unlikely that litigation risk will provide the
incentive necessary to induce optimal audit quality. Even if litigation
risk improves audit quality, the Court’s narrowing of secondary actor
liability under Rule 10b-5 has greatly reduced litigation risk for
auditors.
b. Shareholder Voting
Another source of private enforcement, shareholder voting, is
also unlikely to serve as a significant deterrent. As described earlier,
shareholders rarely decline to ratify the auditor. This reflects the classic
problem of rational apathy. The cost to shareholders of engaging in the
fact-finding necessary to oppose an auditor far exceeds the benefit.
After all, the benefit is opaque; there is no guarantee that management
will switch auditors even if a nontrivial number of shareholders do not
vote to ratify the auditor.99 And the costs are high, as critical
information necessary for shareholders to make an informed decision is
unavailable and/or not easily accessible.
At present, the audit report—which contains the most widely
accessible information on the audit—contains limited detail on how
that audit was conducted.100 Without crucial information pertaining to
the design of the audit, the treatment of critical accounting judgments,
the auditor’s disciplinary history, and the communications between the
auditor and the audit committee, shareholders cannot provide an
informed check on the auditor’s conduct. Thus, it is not surprising that
these votes are considered uninformed and lack influence.

99. For example, shareholders at Imperial Holdings did not vote to ratify the auditor (52.71%
of votes were cast against ratification). Yet, Imperial retained the auditor. John Pakaluk, Auditor
Ratification: An Overview of Russell 3000 Companies, AUDIT ANALYTICS (Apr. 30, 2014),
https://blog.auditanalytics.com/auditor-ratification-an-overview-of-russell-3000-companies/
[https://perma.cc/6XNQ-WKY7]. Similarly, Big Lots, Inc., Healthwarehouse.com, and Immersion
Corp. all retained their auditors after more than 40% of shareholders voted against auditor
ratification. McKeon, supra note 34.
100. The audit report is essentially a pass/fail system. Although it can be unqualified,
qualified, or unqualified with explanatory language, it is typically unqualified with no additional
language (i.e., the company receives a “pass”). From January 1, 2002, through February 20, 2019,
Audit Analytics indicated that roughly 85% of all audit opinions issued to U.S.-based companies
were unqualified without additional explanatory paragraphs (this percentage rises to over 99% for
S&P 500 companies). In an attempt to provide more feedback to investors, the PCAOB recently
adopted a new rule to mandate disclosures of critical accounting matters. PUB. CO. ACCOUNTING
OVERSIGHT BD., RELEASE NO. 2017-001, THE AUDITOR’S REPORT ON AN AUDIT OF FINANCIAL
STATEMENTS WHEN THE AUDITOR EXPRESSES AN UNQUALIFIED OPINION AND RELATED
AMENDMENTS TO PCAOB STANDARDS (2017), https://pcaobus.org/Rulemaking/Docket034/2017001-auditors-report-final-rule.pdf [https://perma.cc/49B2-7WXX].
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c. Termination
Finally, the last source of private enforcement, termination, is
unlikely to induce auditors to act with optimal levels of care. Auditor
termination is infrequent,101 and it is a very costly event for the issuer.
To see why, consider the reasons below.
First, auditor turnover is a negative market signal. Issuers are
notorious for firing their auditor to prevent the release of an
undesirable audit opinion. Thus, investors often respond negatively to
auditor turnover because they are concerned that the company changed
its auditor to block the release of a damaging audit opinion.102 Reactions
are particularly negative when a firm switches its auditor from a Big
Four firm to a non–Big Four firm.103 Regulators, too, are aware that
issuers fire auditors to prevent the release of damaging information, so
they are more likely to investigate a company after auditor turnover.
Thus, a company that wants to change its auditor must weigh the
benefits of the change against the likely negative market reaction upon
announcing the change and the increased possibility of regulatory
scrutiny.104 This is not an attractive choice.
Second, firm managers are often reluctant to switch auditors
because the new auditor will be less familiar with their business and/or
industry, which results in unnecessary cost, time, and effort to get the
new auditor up to speed.105 Even if the new auditor is willing to provide
101. Floyd Norris, Deep Secret: Why Auditors are Replaced, N.Y. TIMES (July 28, 2006),
https://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/28/business/28norris.html [https://perma.cc/JR35-HYBT].
102. John W. Eichenseher et al., Market Reaction to Auditor Changes by OTC Companies, 9
AUDITING, 1989, at 29, 38–40; see also Dov Fried & Allen Schiff¸ CPA Switches and Associated
Market Reactions, 56 ACCT. REV. 326, 338–39 (1981) (finding a correlation between auditor
changes and negative market reactions).
103. Eichenseher et al., supra note 102, at 39 (finding a negative market response when a
company moved away from a Big Eight firm).
104. See Eric R. Holzman et al., Who’s on the Hot Seat for an SEC Investigation and How Do
They
Respond?
18
(Feb.
21,
2019)
(unpublished
manuscript),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3223815 [https://perma.cc/Z6HC-M3ZF].
105. Kemba J. Dunham, Firms that Want to Switch Auditors Find It Takes Time, Money and
Faith, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 15, 2002), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1016150533124417920?
[https://perma.cc/7BZQ-XTQ8]. As an example, consider General Electric (GE). Following
significant cash flow issues, accounting probes, and massive layoffs, GE announced in 2018 that it
would fire its CEO and that eight of its seventeen directors would retire. Nonetheless, even though
only 65% of shareholders voted to ratify the auditor (one of the lowest levels of support in recent
years), GE has, at present, retained KPMG (although it has opened the door to dismissing KPMG
in the future). GE’s explanation for retaining KPMG was notable, as GE stated that it was
important to maintain continuity with its auditor—despite that GE was apparently comfortable
breaking continuity with its directors and CEO. Brendan Case, GE Opens Door to Replace KPMG
as
Auditor
After
Financial
Miscues,
BLOOMBERG
(Dec.
14,
2018),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-12-14/ge-opens-door-to-replace-kpmg-as-auditorafter-financial-miscues [https://perma.cc/Y32W-H94U]; Cydney Posner, Shareholder Vote on
Auditors Puts the Heat on the Board, COOLEY PUBCO (Apr. 26, 2018),
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the issuer with a significant discount as an incentive to switch, that
switch is still going to be costly for the issuer because the new auditing
team will require assistance and employee time to learn the company’s
reporting systems and business.
Finally, even assuming that a firm wants to switch its auditor,
there are few options. A frequently cited benefit of the Big Four is that
they have the expertise and structure to conduct audits of complex
businesses.106 For an issuer who needs this expertise, there are likely to
be fewer than four realistic options. First, due to SOX’s restrictions on
the ability of audit firms to provide nonaudit services to their audit
clients,107 managers will be unable to hire another Big Four firm if that
firm provides it with certain nonaudit services.108 In recent years, the
Big Four have significantly increased sales of nonaudit services to
nonaudit clients—thus potentially preventing an issuer from hiring the
firm as an auditor.109 Second, there is significant auditor concentration
in certain industries. For example, Deloitte and Ernst & Young have
historically audited 88% of the casino industry.110
In sum, the risk of termination is unlikely to induce auditors to
conduct high-quality audits. Firing an auditor leads to substantial costs
for the issuer, so audit committees are hesitant to do so. Auditors, of
course, know the audit committee will be reluctant to fire them, thus
mitigating the incentive that would otherwise arise from the risk of
termination.

https://cooleypubco.com/2018/04/26/shareholder-vote-on-auditors-puts-heat-on-board/
[https://perma.cc/R59G-G39A]; Michael Rapoport, KPMG Gets Cold Shoulder From GE
Shareholders, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 25, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/kpmg-follows-pwc-inadding-independent-directors-to-its-board-1524680342? [https://perma.cc/5NQV-AQLT].
106. Chih-Liang Liu & Shu-Miao Lai, Organizational Complexity and Auditor Quality, 20
CORP. GOVERNANCE 352, 353, 365–66 (2012); see also Dunham, supra note 105 (arguing that firms
are reluctant to switch auditors as the new auditors will be less accustomed to their business and
have less industry expertise).
107. Thomas L. Riesenberg, The Non-Audit Restrictions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, D.G.
MCDERMOTT ASSOCS. (Sept. 24, 2002), https://www.dgm.com/information-center/sarbanes-oxleyinformation/non-audit-service-restrictions-of-the-sarbanes-oxley-act-article
[https://perma.cc/7FED-CLZA].
108. See Liz Loxton, How the Big Four Have Returned to Consulting with a Bang,
ACCOUNTANCY
AGE
(Sept.
27,
2015),
https://www.accountancyage.com/aa/feature/
2427739/feature-how-the-big-four-have-returned-to-consulting-with-a-bang
[https://perma.cc/XS8E-F7K4].
109. See Editorial, Maybe the Big Four Auditing Firms Do Need to Be Broken Up, BLOOMBERG
(June 18, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-06-18/maybe-the-big-fourauditing-firms-do-need-breaking-up [https://perma.cc/V9CM-84E8].
110. See, e.g., Special Report: Called to Account – The Future of Auditing, ECONOMIST (Nov.
20,
2004),
https://www.economist.com/special-report/2004/11/18/called-to-account
[https://perma.cc/B8ND-RANW].
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3. Reputational Risk
Firm reputation risk likely provides the greatest incentive for
auditors to provide high-quality audits. However, due to the
aforementioned stickiness of the relationship between auditors and
issuers—and the significant costs to terminate an auditor—there is
significant reason to doubt that reputation risk provides market
incentives to improve audit quality.
Indeed, consistent with the high costs of terminating an auditor,
U.S. issuers today do not fire Big Four auditors for standard audit
failures, such as restatements.111 This means that reputational
sanctions will not provide marginal incentives to improve audit quality,
leading to suboptimal incentives for audit firms (and the partners who
own those firms). Although partners at these firms are incentivized to
avoid extreme bad behavior that could “kill” the firm, they are not
incentivized to provide marginally better audit quality for purely
business reasons. Instead, as described below in Part II.B, they are
incentivized to focus on growth.
B. Benefits of Individual Auditor Brands
Individual accountability could provide a counterweight to the
current incentive structure.112 First, as described earlier, audit partners
do not internalize the full consequences of an audit failure. Promoting
individual brands will better address this inefficiency and reduce
externalities by causing audit partners to internalize these failures.
Second, greater reliance on overseas participants has significantly
changed audit design in a manner likely to increase risk and introduce
coordination challenges. Prior research has indicated that holding a
single person accountable could reduce this heightened risk.113 Third,
there are significant differences in quality across audit partners, even
among partners in the same firm. Providing this information to market
participants would allow them to select better auditors. Finally, there
is reason to believe that individual reputation markets could increase
competition within the accounting industry.

111. See Kedia, Khan & Rajgopal, supra note 21, at 29 (describing how market share for U.S.
auditors remains constant following routine audit failures).
112. Although 2018 saw renewed calls to break up the Big Four to increase competition, such
dramatic action seems politically infeasible in the United States. For purposes of this Part, I
assume the industry structure is fixed (except for any changes caused by increased accountability).
113. See infra Section II.B.2.
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1. Reducing Externalities by Internalizing Failure
In theory, market forces will penalize an underperforming firm,
and the firm will then penalize the underperforming partner. Each
partner will be properly incentivized to conduct high-quality audits for
clients with acceptable levels of risk. However, as described earlier,
clients do not leave Big Four auditors following standard audit failures,
meaning that the market does not provide marginal deterrence
incentives for an underperforming firm.
Without market incentives to promote audit quality, the Big
Four have rationally structured their compensation to promote
retaining (and increasing) their client base.114 Although the exact
compensation structure is not publicly available and varies by firm,
research has concluded that compensation is driven primarily by the
size of a partner’s clientele and/or the number of publicly traded
clients.115 Attracting new clients is strongly related to an increase in
compensation.116 In at least one of the Big Four, losing a client reduces
compensation.117
Given the financial incentives, a rational auditor will hesitate to
push back strongly against her clients—and her firm will support her
decision. Such incentives are consistent with observed behavior.
Consider, for example, internal feedback reviews provided to a former
Senior Manager at PricewaterhouseCoopers who became an SEC
whistleblower.118 “I don’t think the way he develops his client
relationships is very effective. He doesn’t trust any of his clients,” said
one comment. This performance evaluation contrasts sharply with the
Supreme Court’s view of an auditor’s role as a “public watchdog” that
requires “total independence from the client at all times and requires
complete fidelity to the public trust.”119
Also consistent with these incentives are the repeated instances
in which auditors have assisted clients with the creation of the financial
statements—and then audited those same financials. Independence
rules prohibit this practice,120 as it amounts to the auditor auditing
himself. Although difficult to identify, such violations of independence
114. Knechel et al., supra note 52.
115. Id. at 383.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 384.
118. David S. Hilzenrath, PwC Whistleblower Alleges Fraud in Audits of Silicon Valley
Companies,
PROJECT
ON
GOV’T
OVERSIGHT
(May
10,
2018),
https://www.pogo.org/investigation/2018/05/pwc-whistleblower-alleges-fraud-in-audits-of-siliconvalley-companies/ [https://perma.cc/NT3A-NMTT].
119. United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 818 (1984).
120. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(g) (2012).
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have been revealed through litigation,121 PCAOB inspections,122 SEC
enforcement actions,123 and whistleblowers.124 These anecdotes
contradict the image of a skeptical professional seeking to serve the
investors’ interests but are entirely consistent with the incentive
structure. Audit partners receive a disproportionate share of the
financial benefits paid by a client but share the costs of an audit failure
with their firm (or, at least, the office of their firm).
Promoting individual auditor brands will cause partners to
internalize these failures. As described previously, there are robust
reputation markets in many areas of capital markets, and these
markets provide strong incentives to avoid accounting failures. As
applied to audit partners, who frequently enjoy careers as high-level
corporate managers or directors after making partner,125 we would
expect a similar effect: these auditors will work harder to avoid
reputational harm because their reputation is a valuable asset. Not only
is the auditor’s reputation valuable while he remains at the accounting
firm, where clients must agree to hire him, but it is valuable following

121. See In re Lernout & Hauspie Sec. Litig., 230 F. Supp. 2d 152, 152, 158–59 (D. Mass. 2002)
(finding “clean” audits issued by defendant for financial statements it also helped prepare
contained material misrepresentations); Cashman v. Coopers & Lybrand, 877 F. Supp. 425, 433
(N.D. Ill. 1995) (determining facts were sufficient to support an inference that defendant misstated
financial information in a Prospectus it had a central role in developing and further concealed the
information in a later audit). Even auditors who do not prepare statements may overstep their role
as auditors by suggesting accounting treatments. See, e.g., In re Global Crossing, Ltd. Sec. Litig.,
322 F. Supp. 2d 319, 336 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); In re ZZZZ Best Sec. Litig., 864 F. Supp. 960, 970 (C.D.
Cal. 1994) (discussing plaintiffs’ claims that the auditor materially assisted in the preparation of
misstated financial statements).
122. See, e.g., News Release, Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., PCAOB Fines Deloitte
Canada $350,000 for Failing to Maintain Independence Over Three Consecutive Audits (Oct. 16,
2008),
https://pcaobus.org/News/Releases/Pages/PCAOB-Fines-Deloitte-Canada-$350,000.aspx
[https://perma.cc/74DY-KRGZ] (discussing a PCAOB investigation which uncovered that one
Deloitte branch had audited financial statements that another related branch created).
123. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges PwC LLP With
Violating Auditor Independence Rules and Engaging in Improper Professional Conduct (Sept. 23,
2019),
https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2019-184
[https://perma.cc/6DJB-FPLN]
(discussing an SEC enforcement action against an auditor at PwC who violated independence rules
by providing certain nonaudit services that assisted in the audit process).
124. See, e.g., Hilzenrath, supra note 118 (detailing an account submitted to the SEC by a
former auditor that alleged his former accounting firm compromised ethical standards by
overstepping independence rules).
125. For example, one study found that 6% of audit committee members are public accounting
experts, and 14% of audit committee chairs have public accounting experience. John L. Abernathy
et al., The Association Between Characteristics of Audit Committee Accounting Experts, Audit
Committee Chairs, and Financial Reporting Timeliness, 30 ADVANCES ACCT. 283, 289 (2014).
Although SOX requires a one-year cooling off period before an auditor can work for a client in a
financial reporting oversight role, auditors can work for a different industry client with no coolingoff period. Further, even with the one-year cooling-off period, auditors may return to those clients
later in their careers. 17 C.F.R. § 210.2-01(c)(2) (2019).
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his tenure as an auditor for other prestigious employment
opportunities.126
Forcing the auditor to build a brand that is separate from that
of her firm will force individual audit partners to publicly internalize
the costs of audit failure. This will provide strong incentives to avoid
such failure, as auditors will be incentivized to maintain a high-quality
reputation both during their tenure at the accounting firm and beyond.
2. Improved Audit Quality
A second benefit to individual reputation markets for auditors is
that accountability frequently improves outcomes, particularly in
circumstances requiring coordination challenges.127 Such intuition is
why, for example, SOX requires the CEO and CFO to sign that they are
directly responsible for the accuracy of the financial reporting and the
quality of the internal controls. To date, there is evidence that this
signature requirement has been effective; 68% of practicing auditors
stated that they believe it has improved reporting integrity.128
Regarding auditing specifically, prior work shows that
accountability reduces auditors’ information biases and enhances effort

126. Although it is possible that a focus on individual brands will change demand, leading
firms to change their compensation structure, such a change is tenuous. More importantly, it is
unnecessary to improve incentive-alignment. Lucrative opportunities outside traditional
accounting provide Big Four partners with financial incentives to avoid public association with
audit failure, regardless of internal compensation policies.
127. See Barry R. Schlenker et al., The Triangle Model of Responsibility, 101 PSYCHOL. REV.
632, 634 (1994) (hypothesizing that accountability is a social mechanism of control where
collectively set prescriptions of conduct can be judged and then rewarded or punished accordingly);
see also Marceline B. R. Kroon, Paul’t Hart & Dik van Kreveld, Managing Group Decision Making
Processes: Individual Versus Collective Accountability and Groupthink, 2 INT’L J. CONFLICT MGMT.
91, 108 (1991) (finding that participants held individually accountable were more likely to make
better decisions than those held collectively accountable).
128. Jeffrey Cohen, Ganesh Krishnamoorthy & Arnie Wright, Corporate Governance in the
Post-Sarbanes-Oxley Era: Auditors’ Experiences, 27 CONTEMP. ACCT. RES., 751, 771 (2010).
Additional work finds that earnings management decreased following the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, but
these studies cannot identify the specific effect of the signature requirement, as they cannot
empirically distinguish the effects of the different provisions that went into effect simultaneously.
See, e.g., Gerald Lobo & Jian Zhou, Did Conservatism in Financial Reporting Increase After the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act? Initial Evidence, 20 ACCT. HORIZONS 57, 67–68 (2006) (finding a decrease in
earnings management following the implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act).
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and consensus.129 There is also some evidence that it improves audit
documentation.130
The incentive effects of individual accountability are
particularly important given the changes in audit design over the past
decade. Auditors today frequently rely on overseas auditors, where the
overseas auditors are termed either “component” auditors or “offshore”
auditors. For multinational firms, presumably over half of audit hours
are frequently performed overseas. As described below, this increase in
overseas auditors imposes coordination challenges that increase the
risk of audit failure.
a. Component Auditors
Component auditors are foreign affiliates of the lead accounting
firm that audit the issuer’s international operations. The affiliates may
share the same name as the U.S. auditor (for example,
PricewaterhouseCoopers France) but need not. The lead auditor
generally relies on the same underlying component auditor(s) from year
to year, but there can be variation.
Typically, multinational firms have more than one component
auditor, and the number of hours performed by each component varies
significantly. As shown in Table 1, the firms that disclose the use of
component auditors in Form AP have, on average, 4.69 audit
participants. Of those, 2.95 participants perform less than 5% of audit
hours and 1.75 perform more than 5% of audit hours. At the extreme,
one firm used sixty-five audit participants. On average, these
component auditors perform 29% of total audit hours. At the extreme,

129. See Joseph F. Brazel, Christopher P. Agoglia & Richard C. Hatfield, Electronic Versus
Face-to-Face Review: The Effects of Alternative Forms of Review on Auditors’ Performance, 79
ACCT. REV. 949, 953–54 (2004) (finding that test subjects held accountable for their work during
face-to-face review, as opposed to e-review, prepared work papers which exhibited higher judgment
quality and reflected increased effort in comprehensive evaluation of the evidence); Todd DeZoort,
Paul Harrison & Mark Taylor, Accountability and Auditors’ Materiality Judgements: The Effects
of Differential Pressure Strength on Conservatism, Variability, and Effort, 31 ACCT. ORGS. & SOC’Y
373, 383 (2006) (finding that auditors in an experiment exerted more effort, as measured by time
spent and explanation length, in their auditing task when they were under higher accountability
pressure); Jane Kennedy, Debiasing Audit Judgment with Accountability: A Framework and
Experimental Results, 31 J. ACCT. RES. 231, 240 (1993) (finding that test subjects who were
informed they would be held accountable for their decisionmaking prior to receiving
positive/negative sequential information exhibited no recency bias, in contrast to subjects who
were held not accountable or post-accountable).
130. See H. THOMAS JOHNSON & ROBERT S. KAPLAN, RELEVANCE LOST: THE RISE AND FALL OF
MANAGEMENT ACCOUNTING 12–13 (1987).
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one firm used component auditors for 100% of audit hours (this issuer
is not based in the United States).131
TABLE 1: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ON THE USE OF COMPONENT
AUDITORS, AS DISCLOSED IN FORM AP
Number of
Component
Auditors
Performing
Less than
5% of Total
Audit Hours
(Total)
Mean
Median
Minimum
Maximum

2.95
1
0
63

Number of
Component
Auditors
Performing
Greater than
5% of Total
Audit Hours
(Total)
1.75
1
1
7

Number of
Component
Auditors
(Total)

Estimated
Component
Auditor
Hours (% of
Total Audit
Hours)

4.69
3
1
65

29%
25%
1%
100%

Research on component auditors is limited, presumably because
information on their use was largely unavailable until recently.132
However, the initial studies provide reason to believe that greater use
of component auditors is positively associated with audit failures. For
example, using private data from the PCAOB, Professors Denise
Downey and Jean Bedard show that misstatements are generally
higher for engagements with greater foreign auditor participation.133
Similarly, another team of researchers found that issuers with
significant reliance on component auditors have lower audit quality
than a matched sample of issuers—and that the market responds
negatively to the disclosure of these component auditors.134
131. Table 1 includes the 1,347 issuers noting the use of component auditors in Form AP
(current as of June, 2018). See generally PUB. COMPANY ACCT. OVERSIGHT BD., AUDITOR SEARCH,
https://pcaobus.org/Pages/AuditorSearch.aspx (last visited Aug. 20, 2019) [https://perma.cc/F9PDSDNQ] (providing a downloadable version of the data set, updated daily).
132. Historically, only minimal information on the use of other audit participants was
disclosed on PCAOB Form 2. See PUB. COMPANY ACCT. OVERSIGHT BD., FORM 2 – ANNUAL REPORT
FORM,
https://pcaobus.org/Rules/Pages/Form_2.aspx
(last
visited
Aug.
14,
2019)
[https://perma.cc/WN3E-Y9LL].
133. See Denise H. Downey & Jean C. Bedard, Do Use of Foreign Auditor Personnel and Lead
Engagement Partner Incentives Affect Audit Quality for U.S. Multinational Companies? (2019)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
134. See Carol Callaway Dee, Ayalew Lulseged & Tianming Zhang, Who Did the Audit? Audit
Quality and Disclosures of Other Audit Participants in PCAOB Filings, 90 ACCT. REV. 1939, 1962
(2015) (finding that issuers for which auditors disclosed the use of other participants in Form 2
had lower audit quality than a matched group of issuers); see also Juan Mao, Michael Ettredge &
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It is not difficult to imagine that the use of component auditors
could cause audit quality to decrease.135 The lead engagement partner
is responsible for supervising all component auditors and integrating
their work product, and the scrutiny applied to the component auditors
varies wildly.136 For example, some countries will not allow work papers
created by the component auditor to be removed from the country.137 In
such instances, some U.S. engagement partners will insist on
Mary S. Stone, Group Audits: Are Audit Quality and Price Associated with the Lead Auditor’s
Decision to Accept Responsibility? 29 (July 2019) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author)
(finding that lead auditors accepting responsibility for work done by other auditors charge higher
audit fees but provide the same or lower quality audits).
135. For two reasons, reliance on Chinese component auditors has received the most attention.
First, Chinese auditors are considered notoriously problematic. This is true even for affiliates of
respected U.S. accounting firms. For example, consider China-Biotics Inc., an audit client of BDO
Limited (a Hong-Kong based affiliate of US-based BDO Seidman). When comparing the financials
filed with the U.S. SEC with those filed with the SEC’s Chinese counterpart, the State
Administration for Industry and Commerce (“SAIC”), the numbers are not even in the same
ballpark. China-Biotics Inc. reported revenue of $42.3 million in its 2008 financials filed with the
SEC but only $0.5 million in its SAIC financials for the same year. Chinese Company Analyst,
Orient Paper: Not All BDOs Are the Same, SEEKING ALPHA (July 6, 2010),
https://seekingalpha.com/article/213213-orient-paper-not-all-bdos-are-the-same?page=4
[https://perma.cc/T9KA-6LSK]. Net income was negative in the filings provided to the SAIC, but
positive $17.5 million in the filings provided to the SEC. Id. Without the company name, no reader
would think these filings represented the same company. China’s refusal to allow PCAOB
inspections has only fueled the concerns regarding audit quality in China. Second, many U.S. firms
have substantial audit operations in China, meaning that a misstatement of the Chinese portion
of the audit would likely be material. As an example, consider Walmart’s 2018 audit. Anywhere
from 35 to 70% of the audit hours were performed by component auditors, with Ernst & Young
Hua Ming LLP in Beijing performing 10 to 20% of the work. A significant misstatement of the
Chinese portion of the audit would be material to the whole audit. For media coverage, see, for
example, Michael Rapoport, The Chinese Blind Spot in U.S. Companies’ Financials, WALL ST. J.
(July 21, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-chinese-blind-spot-in-u-s-companies-financials1532170801 [https://perma.cc/6CDK-XYFV]. For discussions of Chinese auditors, see, for example,
Ferdinand A. Gul, Andy Y. Ng & Marian Yew Jen Wu Tong, Chinese Auditors’ Ethical Behavior in
an Audit Conflict Situation, 42 J. BUS. ETHICS 379, 379–80 (2003); Issuers that Are Audit Clients
of PCAOB-Registered Firms from Non-U.S. Jurisdictions Where the PCAOB Is Denied Access to
Conduct Inspections, PUB. COMPANY ACCT. OVERSIGHT BD. (Sept. 10, 2018),
https://pcaobus.org/International/Inspections/Pages/
IssuerClientsWithoutAccess.aspx [https://perma.cc/N8GV-JBPD].
136. See Denise Hanes Downey & Jean C. Bedard, Coordination and Communication
Challenges in Global Group Audits, 38 AUDITING, Feb. 2019, at 123, 127–30 (providing an overview
of the communication techniques used for group audits); see also Dan Sunderland & Gregory M.
Trompeter, Multinational Group Audits: Problems Faced in Practice and Opportunities for
Research, 36 AUDITING, Aug. 2017, at 159, 164 (commenting on barriers between the group and
component auditors, such as distance, language, and customs, along with limitations which
prevent the group auditor from controlling assignments and level of supervision for component
auditors).
137. For example, the Chinese government restricts audit documentation from leaving the
country. See Jay Clayton, Wes Bricker & William D. Duhnke III, Statement on the Vital Role of
Audit Quality and Regulatory Access to Audit and Other Information Internationally—Discussion
of Current Information Access Challenges with Respect to U.S.-listed Companies with Significant
Operations in China, SEC (Dec. 7, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/statementvital-role-audit-quality-and-regulatory-access-audit-and-other [https://perma.cc/S8M3-L4YW].
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embedding one or more members of the U.S. team with the component
auditor to allow the U.S. team to monitor the component. However,
other U.S. engagement partners may simply take the component
auditor at its word that the numbers supplied by management are
materially free from inaccuracies.138
b. Offshore Auditors
Audit work is also performed overseas by “offshore” auditors. In
response to financial pressure to cut costs following the recent financial
crisis, accounting firms started sending more and more work to
“offshore auditors,” meaning that the lead auditor delegates work to the
firm’s offices located outside the lead auditor’s country of headquarters.
Estimates suggest that offshore auditors perform 10 to 20% of audit
hours.139 Offshoring differs from the use of component auditors because
the offshore auditors assist in the work of the lead auditor rather than
audit the issuer’s international operations. Further, unlike the work of
component auditors, work sent to offshore centers is typically not
disclosed. These centers are frequently part of the U.S. firm, so sending
work to these centers does not count as sending work to a foreign
affiliate.140
Commentators have expressed concern that offshoring audit
work may lead to any number of negative outcomes, ranging from a
deterioration in audit quality to data and privacy issues.141 However,
proponents of audit offshoring have touted its efficiency and pointed to
its potential benefits; for example, by offshoring dredge work, U.S. team
members can focus on more nuanced accounting issues.
There is limited empirical evidence on the effects of audit
offshoring, likely due to the lack of data availability. The only
138. See Sunderland & Trompeter, supra note 136, at 164.
139. See Mignon Farnet, Globalization and Offshoring: The Effects of a Globalized Workplace
on Auditing Procedures 48 (May 2016) (unpublished B.S. capstone project, Syracuse University
Honors Program), https://surface.syr.edu/honors_capstone/974/?utm_source=surface.syr.edu%2
Fhonors_capstone%2F974&utm_medium=PDF&utm_campaign=PDFCoverPages
[https://perma.cc/YTR4-M2SV] (estimating that approximately 10% of work is offshored); Dena
Aubin & Sumeet Chatterjee, Analysis: As More U.S. Audit Work Moves to India, Concerns Arise,
REUTERS (Oct. 16, 2012), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-audit-india/analysis-as-more-u-saudit-work-moves-to-india-concerns-arise-idUSBRE89F1GC20121016
[https://perma.cc/USH5VX62] (“PwC’s goal is to send about 20 percent of audit work to the delivery centers, said the firm’s
global chairman, Dennis Nally.”).
140. For example, Deloitte India is a region within the Deloitte U.S. organization. See Our
Offices, DELOITTE., https://www2.deloitte.com/ui/en/footerlinks/office-locator.html# (last visited
Aug. 14, 2019) [https://perma.cc/KX2E-DL9R].
141. See Tammy Whitehouse, Offshored External Audits Expose Regulatory Issues,
COMPLIANCE WK. (Apr. 1, 2009), https://www.complianceweek.com/offshored-external-auditsexpose-regulatory-issues/5228.article [https://perma.cc/7RCA-Q6NM].
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significant work studying audit offshoring has bypassed the lack of data
availability by conducting interviews and/or experimental research.142
These studies typically suggest that offshoring lowers audit quality—
or, more precisely, that market participants believe it does. For
example, two experimental studies have provided evidence that “jurors”
(that is, experimental participants who were asked to play the role of
jurors for the experiment) perceive outsourced audit work to be of lower
quality and were more likely to award greater damages when work was
performed offshore.143
In sum, auditing has changed significantly in ways that seem
likely to increase the risk of audit failure. Solutions designed to induce
high-quality audits need to consider these changes in audit design. One
such solution is increased individual accountability, which prior
research suggests can reduce coordination challenges and mitigate the
risk of audit failure by reducing auditors’ information biases and
enhancing auditors’ effort and consensus.
3. Market Participant Incentives
Finally, a third benefit to individual auditor accountability is
that market participants will have better information when selecting
an auditor. There are significant differences in quality among audit
partners, even partners within the same firm. Providing this
information to the market will allow for more informed auditor
selection.
a. Heterogeneity in Audit Partner Quality
Significant research shows that audit partners differ in quality.
Most of these studies are international, as partner identities were not
disclosed in the United States until recently. However, some U.S.-based
research finds consistent results, suggesting that the international
studies translate to the U.S. setting.

142. See Denise Hanes Downey, An Exploration of Offshoring in Audit Practice and the
Potential Consequences of Associated Work “Redesign” on Auditor Performance, 37 AUDITING, May
2018, at 197, 202, 209 (examining offshore auditing by interviewing six different auditors with
varying experience and completing an experiment to measure work design issues present in
offshore auditing); Alex Lyubimov, Vicky Arnold & Steve G. Sutton, An Examination of the Legal
Liability Associated with Outsourcing and Offshoring Audit Procedures, 32 AUDITING, May 2013,
at 97 (conducting an experiment which measured jurors’ perceptions of auditor liability after an
audit failure for insource, outsource, onshore, and offshore work).
143. Brian Daughtery, Denise Dickins & M. G. Fennema, The Effects of Offshoring Audit Tasks
on Jurors’ Evaluations of Damage Awards Against Auditors, in 16 ADVANCES IN ACCT. BEHAV.
RES. 55, 73 (Donna Bobek Schmitt ed., 2013); Lyubimov, Arnold & Sutton, supra note 142, at 115.
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In particular, research has found that certain partners are
significantly more likely to be associated with negative accounting
events, such as restatements. For example, using Taiwanese data, one
study found that the likelihood of poor audit quality is higher when the
engagement partner has a recent history of poor audit quality, holding
observable client risk characteristics constant. Similar results have
been found using data from other countries.144 For example, researchers
using Swedish data found that audit characteristics, such as
aggressiveness and conservatism, persist over time and are highly
correlated across audits led by the same partner. The authors conclude
that “[a]uditor aggressive or conservative reporting is a systematic
audit partner attribute and not randomly distributed across
engagements.”145
Within the United States, data limitations have led studies to
focus on forced turnovers146 rather than time-series analyses.147
Securities law requires that lead audit partners rotate off an audit
engagement for an SEC registrant after five years,148 so several studies
examine accounting quality when the new auditor comes on board. For
example, Professors Laurion, Lawrence, and Ryan identified
mandatory partner rotations using SEC comment letters, and they
found evidence of increases in restatements and deferred tax valuation
allowances following partner rotations.149 Professors Gipper, Hail, and
Leuz similarly examine changes in audit quality following a rotation,
but they obtain private PCAOB data, allowing for a much larger
sample.150 They find a higher likelihood that the auditor issues an
144. Knechel, Vanstraelen & Zerni, supra note 52 (finding variation using Swedish data). For
studies using Chinese data, see Ferdinand A. Gul, Donghui Wu & Zhifeng Yang, Do Individual
Auditors Affect Audit Quality? Evidence from Archival Data, 88 ACCT. REV. 1993 (2013) and Xiaoke
Wang et al., Engagement Audit Partner Experience and Audit Quality, 3 CHINA J. OF ACCT. STUD.,
no. 3, 2015, at 230.
145. W. Robert Knechel, Ann Vanstraelen & Mikko Zerni, Does the Identity of Engagement
Partners Matter? An Analysis of Audit Partner Reporting Decisions, 32 CONTEMP. ACCT. RES. 1443,
1473 (2015).
146. In addition to studies on mandatory auditor rotations under securities laws, one study
examines clients required to switch to new accounting firms after the demise of Arthur Andersen
and finds these firms were much more likely to restate earnings, further suggesting variation in
auditors. Alexander Dyck, Adair Morse & Luigi Zingales, How Pervasive is Corporate Fraud? 4
(Rotman Sch. of Mgmt., Working Paper No. 2222608, 2013), https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2222608 [https://perma.cc/B2JV-C53K].
147. Time-series analysis examines the same observations at successive times (e.g., the same
firms in different years).
148. 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(j) (2012).
149. Henry Laurion, Alastair Lawrence & James P. Ryans, U.S. Audit Partner Rotations, 92
ACCT. REV., May 2019, at 209, 232.
150. Brandon Gipper, Luzi Hail & Christian Leuz, On the Economics of Audit Partner Tenure
and Rotation: Evidence from PCAOB Data (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
w24018,
2018),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3023725
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internal control weakness.151 There are two explanations for the
increase in accounting-related issues when a new partner arrives. First,
the incoming partner may identify additional issues undetected by the
prior partner. Second, the incoming partner may not be comfortable
with the accounting interpretations accepted by the prior partner.152
b. Market Participants
If market participants such as audit committees and
shareholders are provided with sufficient detail to identify the
heterogeneity across individual auditors, they have strong incentives to
use the information to select higher-quality auditors.
Audit Committees. The audit committee is a subcommittee of
the Board of Directors and is primarily responsible for providing
oversight of the reporting process. Audit committee members have
strong incentives to select high-quality auditors. First, they have a
fiduciary duty to shareholders. Second, directors incur career-limiting
reputational sanctions if they are associated with an audit failure.153 As
noted previously, directors are more likely to depart a firm following
earnings restatements or financial fraud. Finally, should the audit
committee members make a poor selection, shareholders can, in theory,
vote them out.154 In sum, out of self-preservation, audit committees
[https://perma.cc/33WE-QJG8]. Note that this study failed to find other “fresh look” benefits of
mandatory rotations.
151. Id. Internal controls are processes and procedures that induce high-quality financial
reporting. Internal controls are abstract in theory, but they are intuitive in practice. Consider this
common scenario: A controller receives an email that appears to be from a supplier, and the email
requests that the controller send payment to a new routing number. The controller remits payment
according to the instructions in the email, only to later learn that he has been defrauded. The
email was not from the supplier, but from a bad actor who is now millions of dollars richer. Rather
than simply wire millions of public-company dollars to a new account, the controller should have
called the supplier to confirm the email’s legitimacy. And the failure to do so reflects an internal
control weakness: either the company lacks procedures requiring verification of new accounts
before making payments, or the company’s controller failed to follow those procedures. Either way,
the company’s controls are problematic. See, e.g., AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. ACCOUNTANTS, THE
IMPORTANCE OF INTERNAL CONTROL IN FINANCIAL REPORTING AND SAFEGUARDING PLAN ASSETS 4
(2014),
https://www.aicpa.org/content/dam/aicpa/interestareas/employeebenefitplanauditquality/resource
s/planadvisories/downloadabledocuments/plan-advisoryinternalcontrol-hires.pdf
[https://perma.cc/62CB-V6GS].
152. Of course, it is entirely possible that two partners are of identical quality but identify
different accounting issues, leading to disclosure of accounting-related issues upon rotation.
153. See supra notes 43–44 and accompanying text (describing the negative consequences of
being associated with an audit failure).
154. For example, Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) recommended against audit
committee members at Ryman Hospital Partners after these directors approved spending on
nonaudit services that ISS deemed excessive. Geert De Lombaerde, Proxy Advisor Calls for ‘No’
Vote
on
Ryman
Directors,
E&Y,
NASHVILLE
POST
(May
1,
2013),
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have strong incentives to use all available information to select a highquality auditor.
Shareholders. Shareholders, too, are likely to use the
information. When picking stocks, they have strong incentives to avoid
companies with low-quality accounting.155 Shareholders suffer
significant losses upon disclosure of a restatement—far more than the
value of the restatement itself.156 By obtaining information on the
partner leading the audit, investors can better assess the financial risk
of a company and price the stock accordingly. Indeed, an experimental
study supports this view; the authors found that shareholders were less
likely to select a peer firm audited by a partner who had overseen an
audit failure.157 Knowing that investors rely on the information when
purchasing a stock will provide even greater pressure on audit
committees to select high-quality auditors.158
In sum, there is ample reason to expect broader dissemination
of information on the quality of individual auditors to reduce audit
failures. It is clear that information on individual auditors is valuerelevant, and that auditors are not interchangeable. Shareholders and,
especially, audit committee members have strong incentives to use this
type of information.159
4. Increased Competition
Finally, auditor reputation markets could increase competition.
The lack of competition in the upper echelon of accounting, where four
https://www.nashvillepost.com/business/area-stocks/article/20469678/proxy-advisor-calls-for-novote-on-ryman-directors-ey (last visited Sept. 27, 2019) [https://perma.cc/U47R-4QDC].
155. Even if the collection action problem leads investors to be rationally apathetic with regard
to shareholder voting, it does not follow that an investor will neglect to conduct research before
purchasing a stock.
156. See Jonathan M. Karpoff, D. Scott Lee & Gerald S. Martin, The Cost to Firms of Cooking
the Books, 43 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 581 (2008) (examining the financial impact on
firms caught engaging in financial misrepresentation). The extreme negative market reaction to
accounting failures contrasts with other negative events. For example, the loss in market value
caused by other events (e.g., environmental fine) is similar to the cost of the fine. However, the loss
in value caused by accounting failures is greater than the loss of the restatement itself.
157. Tamara A. Lambert, Benjamin L. Luippold & Chad M. Stefaniak, Audit Partner
Disclosure: An Experimental Exploration of Accounting Information Contagion, 30 BEHAV. RES. IN
ACCT. 27, 37 (2018).
158. It is also possible that shareholders would use the information when voting, making
private enforcement more effective. With more information, shareholders could provide more
informed votes on auditor ratification, and they could target individual directors on the audit
committee if they were not pleased with the auditor selection. However, due to rational apathy in
voting, this avenue is less likely.
159. Other recent work has called for increases in shareholders’ power over the auditor’s
appointment. See Coffee, supra note 64, at 2 (“[A] more feasible approach would be to give investors
greater ability to select and remove the auditor.”).
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firms dominate the market, is a constant regulatory concern. Various
proposals ranging from mandatory multi-firm audits to a forced
breakup of the Big Four have gotten some traction, particularly in the
United Kingdom.160
By contrast, my proposal could increase competition naturally.
As noted previously, some of the reasons why issuers are hesitant to
terminate their auditors include that (1) they are concerned the market
will “punish” them if they switch to a non–Big Four auditor; (2) there
can be significant costs associated with switching (e.g., employees at the
issuer will incur significant time getting the new auditor up to speed);
and (3) there are often few options, as some firms have more industry
expertise and other firms are excluded because they provide certain
nonaudit services.
Public knowledge of the auditor’s reputation could mitigate
these concerns. If the market trusts the reputation of an individual
partner, clients may be able to switch to non–Big Four accounting firms
without penalty if they switch to (or with) a highly regarded audit
partner.161 Further, if they switch with a partner who brings her team
to the new firm, the costs for the “new” team to get set up will be trivial.
Finally, even if the new accounting firm has limited experience with an
industry, there may be a partner with substantial expertise—or the
accounting firm may hire a partner specifically to obtain such expertise.
Ultimately, accounting firms could look more like law firms,
which have thriving lateral markets.162 Accounting firms, at present, do
not. After all, if an individual auditor has no public reputation and her
clients are unlikely to follow her switch, recruiting a lateral is far less
attractive. However, based on similar industries, such as credit and
firm analysts, there is reason to believe that building a partner’s brand

160. See Louis Ashworth, Pressure Mounts on the CMA to Break Up Accountancy’s Big Four,
CITY A.M. (Oct. 1, 2018, 12:34 AM), http://www.cityam.com/264093/pressure-mounts-cma-breakup-accountancys-big-four [https://perma.cc/4TQE-F6HX]; Paulina Duran, Australia Calls on Bank
Outsiders to Break Up Big Four Dominance, REUTERS (Aug. 3, 2018, 11:40 PM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-australia-banks/australia-calls-on-bank-outsiders-to-breakup-big-four-dominance-idUSKBN1KO0EV [https://perma.cc/HQF2-9TCZ]; Madison Marriage, EY
Hits Back at Calls to Break Up Big Four Accounting Firms, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 13, 2018),
https://www.ft.com/content/36188f82-b6a9-11e8-bbc3-ccd7de085ffe
[https://perma.cc/T2XER34E]; Joseph Smith, Multi-firm Audits can Break the Big Four’s Oligopoly, FIN. TIMES (July 23,
2019), https://www.ft.com/content/bc5afbc4-a3fd-11e9-a282-2df48f366f7d [https://perma.cc/G8Y9HTV4].
161. For example, perhaps a high-quality partner who leaves KPMG for a smaller accounting
firm, such as Grant Thornton, would be able to retain his clients because market participants
would trust the partner, even though Grant Thornton is outside the Big Four.
162. Dylan Jackson, Law Firm Lifers and the Hot Lateral Market, LAW.COM: DAILY BUS. REV.
(Apr. 2, 2019), https://www.law.com/dailybusinessreview/2019/04/02/law-firm-lifers-and-the-hotlateral-market/ [https://perma.cc/DYM4-3CPK].
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separately from that of her firm could have this type of effect on mobility
and competition.163
In sum, there is reason to believe that individual auditor
reputation markets could increase competition in the industry. Of
course, this is not a perfect fix, and there remains reason to doubt that
individual accountability alone would break up the Big Four.
Nonetheless, it is a possibility worth pursuing—and would certainly be
more politically palatable than drastic regulatory action to break up the
Big Four.
C. Objections
There are many reasons to be skeptical of reputation markets
for individual auditors. In this section, I discuss some common
objections.
1. Audit Fees
First, a greater focus on the reputation of the audit partner will
likely raise the costs of an audit. The auditor will bear increased risk,
which will incentivize her to (1) incur more audit hours to validate the
underlying opinion and (2) increase her personal compensation to
account for the increased risk. As described below, empirical work
indicates that this conjecture has already occurred, as there is evidence
that audit fees increased after firms were required to disclose the name
of the lead audit partner (the biggest step in developing reputation
markets).
Although not ideal, the benefits of individual accountability
outweigh the increase in fees, particularly because the increase in fees
associated with disclosure of the partner’s identity appears to be
relatively modest. For example, when examining the change in audit
fees after mandatory audit partner disclosure in the United Kingdom,
Professors Carcello and Li found average audit fees of $475,900 in the
pre-period and $477,000 in the post-period.164 Similar studies have

163. See Section I.C.2 (explaining the improved audit quality that results from individual
auditor brands). Further consider, for example, Mike Mayo. After Credit Suisse First Boston fired
Mayo, he worked at CLSA (a Chinese brokerage) but remained a highly visible presence in the
media. After CLSA, he went to work for Wells Fargo, bringing members of his team with him.
Laura Noonan & Ben McLannahan, Big Banks’ Critic Mike Mayo to Join Wells Fargo, FIN. TIMES
(June
12,
2017),
https://www.ft.com/content/
ccce5678-4f35-11e7-bfb8-997009366969
[https://perma.cc/EBH8-ME2J].
164. Joseph V. Carcello & Chan Li, Costs and Benefits of Requiring an Engagement Partner
Signature: Recent Experience in the United Kingdom, 88 ACCT. REV. 1511, 1524 (2013). The
difference was not significant with univariate results, but it becomes significant in regression
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examined whether U.S. audit fees also increased following the
introduction of Form AP, but the results have been inconsistent.165
Regardless, even if the findings that the disclosure led to a
modest increase in audit fees are correct, the cost of poor accounting
quality is far more significant. On average, prior work has found that
restatements result in losses of market value of 9.2%,166 far exceeding
the financial cost of the misstatement.167 For even the smallest company
in the S&P 500, an estimate of –9.2% suggests a loss of over $260
million.168 If the development of individual brands provides even a 1%
decrease in the frequency of significant audit failures, that savings will,
on average, far, far exceed the increase in audit fees.
2. Increased Conservatism
Second, this proposal may lead to more conservative financial
reporting. If auditors are concerned with their individual reputations,
or if they believe the disclosure will increase their risk of legal liability,
they may be overly conservative. Preliminary evidence suggests that
such an effect is likely. In the United Kingdom, the frequency of goingconcern opinions was 3.3% in the year prior to audit partner disclosure
and 6.5% in the year following audit partner disclosure.169
On the one hand, excessive conservatism does not improve audit
quality, as it sends a false signal to the market. On the other hand,
accounting is, by definition, conservative. As a whole, the profession has
chosen to err on the side of conservatism. For example, this is the
intuition for why assets are recorded at historical cost and written down
if their value decreases—but are not “written up” if they appreciate.
Moreover, companies may provide additional disclosures that
counteract the conservatism of auditors. For example, over 90% of
companies now provide both Generally Accepted Accounting Principles

analysis with control variables. Id. at 1532. Of course, this only reflects any increase associated
with the disclosure of the engagement partner, which is only one aspect of increasing individual
accountability. And this reflects an increase in the United Kingdom, which is less litigious than
the United States.
165. See supra note 61.
166. Zoe-Vonna Palmrose, Vernon J. Richardson & Susan Scholz, Determinants of Market
Reactions to Restatement Announcements, 37 J. ACCT. ECON. 59, 60 (2004) (finding mean returns
of -9.2% over a two-day event window).
167. Karpoff, Lee & Martin, supra note 156, at 594–96.
168. October 2019 List of All S&P 500 Stocks & Companies, SURE DIVIDEND (Oct. 2, 2019),
https://www.suredividend.com/sp-500-stocks/.
169. Carcello & Li, supra note 164, at 1524.
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(“GAAP”) and non–GAAP financials in their annual reports.170 The
non–GAAP numbers are rarely audited.171 Therefore, the increased
conservatism only affects a subset of the information that companies
report to their investors, allowing companies to fight back if they believe
the auditor is overly conservative.
3. Personal Concerns
Third, there are personal concerns for the auditor herself.
Introducing reputation markets raises serious concerns regarding
fairness, safety, and privacy. It is entirely possible that some auditors
will unfairly receive an undeserved reputational stigma. For example,
perhaps a certain auditor is put on risky audits precisely because he is
of high quality and best positioned to prevent misstatements. This
auditor is likely to be associated with a higher than baseline probability
of audit failure, an outcome entirely inconsistent with his actual
quality. To prevent such outcomes, high-quality partners may refuse to
work with high-risk clients, even though these are the clients that
would benefit most from their expertise.
Of course, this issue is not unique to auditors. Perhaps most
similarly, FINRA has comparable concerns with Brokercheck, its online
database containing past broker misconduct. This database includes
unverified customer complaints, prompting concerns that certain
brokers are unfairly targeted. In response, FINRA allows brokers two
options. First, brokers can respond to each complaint, and their
response will be publicly visible just below the initial complaint.172
Second, brokers may expunge infractions from the database.173
Greater individual reputational risk also raises concerns
regarding safety and privacy. Individuals (and their families) involved
in high-profile financial failures have been threatened. For example,
when it was publicly disclosed in March 2009 that American
International Group (“AIG”) intended to pay over $150 million in
170. Matthew Stock, Deceptive Non-GAAP Financials Will Lead to Future SEC Whistleblower
Awards, ACCT. TODAY (May 18, 2018), https://www.accountingtoday.com/opinion/deceptive-nongaap-financials-will-lead-to-future-sec-whistleblower-awards [https://perma.cc/DE2F-7QVW].
171. See PUB. COMPANY ACCT. OVERSIGHT BOARD, AS 2710: OTHER INFORMATION IN
DOCUMENTS
CONTAINING
AUDITED
FINANCIAL
STATEMENTS,
https://pcaobus.org/Standards/Auditing/Pages/AS2710.aspx (last visited Aug. 23, 2019)
[https://perma.cc/4XCF-X8R9] (“[T]he auditor has no obligation to perform any procedures to
corroborate other information contained in a document.”).
172. Guidelines for Broker Comments on BrokerCheck, FIN. INDUSTRY REG. AUTHORITY,
https://www.finra.org/registration-exams-ce/individuals/guidelines-broker-commentsbrokercheck (last accessed Oct. 27, 2019) [https://perma.cc/D5DN-22TV].
173. See Honigsberg & Jacob, supra note 45, at 5–6 (describing the process and frequency of
expungement).

4. Honigsberg(Do Not Delete)

2019]

11/16/2019 12:48 PM

INDIVIDUAL AUDIT PARTNER ACCOUNTABILITY

1915

employee bonuses after receiving a taxpayer-funded bailout at the
height of the financial crisis, AIG employees received death threats.174
Consequently, AIG had to hire guards and required an increased police
presence.175 In sum, although society has chosen to require individual
disclosure for other actors,176 the potential safety issues are serious
concerns.
4. Litigation Risk
Fourth, there are concerns that the disclosures will give rise to
private liability beyond reputational costs.177 Exposing individuals to
such litigation risk could raise audit costs considerably and, as
mentioned earlier, would not necessarily increase audit quality.
Although an increase in litigation risk may ultimately be necessary to
induce the proper incentives,178 a market-oriented solution is preferable
to increasing litigation risk at this time.179
174. Brady Dennis & David Cho, Rage at AIG Swells As Bonuses Go Out, WASH. POST (Mar.
17,
2009),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/03/16/
AR2009031602961.html [https://perma.cc/78VL-AKU4].
175. Id.; see also AIG Bonus Outrage has Employees Living in Fear, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Mar.
20, 2009, 6:47 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/29802167/ns/business-stocks_and_economy/t/aigbonus-outrage-has-employees-living-fear/ [https://perma.cc/Y2MJ-22BA] (“Security companies in
New York say the financial crisis has created brisk business in everything from bomb-sniffing dogs
to bodyguards for executives.”).
176. For example, we require such disclosure for broker-dealers, investment advisers, and
sexual offenders, among others. See Megan’s Law, 42 U.S.C. § 14071(d), (repealed 2006) ( requiring
the release of relevant information to protect the public from sexually violent offenders);
BROKERCHECK, https://brokercheck.finra.org/ (last visited Sept. 27, 2019) [https://perma.cc/4BWUTGGP] (providing a free tool to research financial brokers’ background and experience);
INVESTMENT ADVISER PUB. DISCLOSURE, https://www.adviserinfo.sec.gov/ (last visited Mar. 19,
2019) [https://perma.cc/55DU-PGHS] (offering Form ADV and investment adviser history).
177. See Cathy J. Cole, Audit Partner Accountability and Audit Transparency: Partner
Signature or Disclosure Requirement, 14 J. ACCT. & FIN. 84, 94 (2014) (describing comment letters
noting potential increases in litigation risk).
178. Past reforms have focused on reducing conflicts of interest rather than increasing private
enforcement. See Coffee, supra note 64, at 2 (noting that prior reforms imposed consulting
restrictions, a cooling-off period, and independence rules). However, policymakers have now
reduced conflicts of interest to the extent reasonably feasible. Should there be another significant
accounting failure along the lines of Enron, it is plausible that Congress will increase litigation
risk despite that its effect on audit quality is unclear. This pending threat provides greater
incentive to find a market-based solution.
179. Two more objections bear mention. First, it is possible that a greater focus on individual
brands will have no effect, as auditors already have significant incentives to perform high-quality
work. If so, there would be a cost with no benefit. However, given that some preliminary research
on disclosure of the name of the audit partner suggests this disclosure alone had an effect, this
objection seems inconsistent with the data. Second, another objection is that separating the brand
of an auditor from that of her firm may reduce firm accountability. If so, the firm may reduce the
support that it provides to auditors. However, given that audit partners own the firm and
determine its spending priorities, the partners are incentivized to continue funding the firm’s
infrastructure and internal support to the degree they are beneficial.
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III. TOWARD OPTIMAL AUDITOR BRAND DEVELOPMENT
Regulators in the United States recently mandated disclosure of
the engagement partner—the preliminary step in developing individual
auditor brands. However, this disclosure is only a first step. For private
markets to develop useful Auditor Scorecards and build efficient
reputation markets, regulators should mandate disclosure of additional
relevant information and ensure that usable information is revealed
through their enforcement actions.180
A. Additional Disclosures
To be most effective, the Scorecard needs to contain information
that will allow market participants to identify high- and low-quality
auditors. With sufficient time-series data, the partner name alone will
provide a noisy signal. However, regulators should mandate disclosure
of information that will provide the market with a more precise signal—
and sooner.
1. PCAOB Disciplinary Proceedings
For starters, the PCAOB should be permitted to publicly disclose
PCAOB disciplinary proceedings. As noted earlier, these proceedings
are confidential and nonpublic unless all parties consent to make the
information public,181 and the confidentiality extends until the case is
either settled or all appeals have been exhausted.182 This provides
parties with significant incentives to fully draw out the appeals process,
including appealing any discipline up to the SEC. This can take years.
Officially, the explanation for the confidentiality is that PCAOB
disciplinary proceedings contain market-moving information, and
disclosing such unproven allegations prematurely would disadvantage
issuers. That is, disclosure of a PCAOB disciplinary proceeding not only
punishes the accounting firm, but also the client. Unofficially,
congressional staffers say that the explanation for the confidentiality is
that the accounting firms have lobbied heavily for its protection.

180. Professor Coffee has similarly called for a scorecard-related disclosure. In particular, he
called for disclosure of the grades that audit firms receive from regulators. Coffee, supra note 64,
at 10. But, due to individual variation, it is an empirical question as to whether the general grade
is reflective of the individual audits.
181. Modesti, supra note 76.
182. 15 U.S.C. § 7215(d)(1) (2012).

4. Honigsberg(Do Not Delete)

2019]

11/16/2019 12:48 PM

INDIVIDUAL AUDIT PARTNER ACCOUNTABILITY

1917

Bipartisan congressional representatives have proposed to make the
proceedings public, all to no avail.183
Of course, there needs to be some level of certainty before
disclosing the disciplinary proceedings. However, the requirement that
all appeals must be complete is excessive and deprives the public of
timely and value-relevant information. It is also unnecessary to protect
the issuer, as regulators can release disciplinary actions against an
auditor while withholding the name of the issuer.184 Going forward,
similar to the SEC’s process, the disciplinary proceedings should be
disclosed when the regulator decides to file an enforcement action.185
2. Overseas Auditors
Regulators should require disclosure not only on the existence of
other audit participants, but on the lead auditor’s supervision of those
other auditors. As mentioned previously, supervision can vary wildly.
Providing this additional context would make the information in Form
AP far more meaningful.
Further, Form AP requires disclosure of the use of component
auditors, but it does not require any information on offshore auditors.
Regulators should require that accounting firms disclose the use of
offshore auditors and the type of work that is sent to these offshore
auditors. If the information is nonjudgmental audit work, such as
counting widgets, it seems unlikely that investors will be terribly
concerned. However, if the offshore auditor is performing judgmental
work that requires, for example, the subjective determination of
whether an accounting treatment is acceptable, investors are likely to
be more concerned.
B. Enforcement Priorities
Finally, to the extent possible and equitable, regulators should
highlight the fault of the individual(s) involved when bringing
disciplinary actions against auditors. Individual accountability in
corporate enforcement was a focus of the Obama Administration—Sally
Yates authored a memo stating that the DOJ should focus on the

183. See sources cited supra note 75.
184. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 123.
185. U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, DIVISION OF ENFORCEMENT, ENFORCEMENT
MANUAL
18
(2017),
https://www.sec.gov/divisions/enforce/enforcementmanual.pdf
[https://perma.cc/UYK8-Y2NZ].
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individuals involved in corporate malfeasance186—and some regulatory
actions already take this approach.187 However, the Trump
Administration has appeared to back off individual accountability in
corporate enforcement, arguing that it is prohibitively costly to make a
case against all individuals involved.188 It is unclear to what extent the
Trump administration’s decision to focus less on individual
accountability for corporate actors is political, as the administration
continues to focus on individuals in other settings such as immigration.
However, if the administration is correct that individual accountability
is prohibitively costly for corporate actors, a compromise could be to
name the individuals involved even if the government brings its case
against the institution as a whole. Reputation markets do not need
formal enforcement to incorporate subpar conduct.
Further, in some instances, regulators decline to pursue
discipline if the infractions appear too modest. Because even seemingly
minor infractions, such as customer complaints, are significant
predictors of bad acts in other areas,189 it would be worthwhile for the
SEC and PCAOB to amend these enforcement policies. When possible,
regulators should pursue even modest infractions to provide a public
record of these infractions, as they would still likely provide important
information to the market.
C. Visibility and Presentation
Finally, to spur the development of auditor reputation markets,
the critical disclosures should be easily accessible. At present, auditorrelevant information is disclosed through issuer and auditor filings on
the SEC and PCAOB’s websites, disciplinary actions by any number of
agencies, and company filings abroad. For example, as mentioned
earlier, the identity of the audit partner is disclosed on the PCAOB’s
website in a form filed by the auditor, but it must be linked to
186. Memorandum from Sally Quillian Yates, Deputy Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Justice, on
Individual
Accountability
for
Corporate
Wrongdoing
(Sept.
9,
2015),
https://www.justice.gov/archives/dag/file/769036/download [https://perma.cc/2JY6-97RD].
187. Dylan Tokar, The Department of Justice Is Turning Back the Clock on Corporate
Accountability, NATION (Mar. 6, 2019), https://www.thenation.com/article/financial-crisis-justicedepartment-corporate-prosecutions-yates-memo/ [https://perma.cc/Q6D2-FKAS]. Consistent with
the Yates memo, some disciplinary actions already name the auditor(s) involved. Others, however,
are more generally against a firm even when the action concerns an individual. See PUB. COMPANY
ACCT. OVERSIGHT BOARD, SETTLED DISCIPLINARY ORDERS 4 (Oct. 16, 2018),
https://pcaobus.org/Enforcement/Decisions/Documents/105-2018-020-Deloitte-Canada.pdf
[https://perma.cc/S85G-H7HA] (stating that Deloitte Canada violated independence rules, but not
stating the name of the auditor in question).
188. Tokar, supra note 187.
189. Egan, Matvos & Seru, supra note 45, at 246, 248.
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information disclosed through other sources (for example, disciplinary
actions or audit failures) to be useful.
Market participants would benefit from straightforward
disclosure in one location. Equity analysts have long created reports
summarizing company performance and recommending whether to
buy, sell, or hold the stock. Credit rating analysts use a similar system
for company debt. And financial advisors provide their employment and
disciplinary history online through websites maintained by FINRA and
the SEC. Even scorecards on mutual funds are now available.190
Although the Auditor Scorecards would be most effective with
the additional disclosures described previously, there is already
sufficient information to provide a noisy signal of the audit partner’s
quality. However, with the additional information described, the
Scorecard could be more similar to what is provided for financial
advisors.191 Providing all this information in a centralized location
would greatly reduce the costs of acquisition and make the information
more broadly accessible. Although there is reason to doubt the
effectiveness of such disclosures in purely consumer contexts,192
disclosures seem to drive behavioral changes in securities markets.193

190. See e.g., Mutual Fund Management Co, INVESTOR, https://investor.com/rias/mutual-fundmanagement-co-107538 (last updated Aug. 6, 2019) [https://perma.cc/R2W9-5CFL] (providing
information about the mutual fund, including its assets under management and disciplinary
history).
191. In particular, it could show the auditor’s employment history (years of experience, clients,
employers, education), clients, fees associated with prior audits, critical audit matters associated
with prior audits, use of overseas auditors (if applicable), disciplinary history (if applicable), and
any audit failures associated with his clients (if applicable).
192. See Daniel E. Ho, Zoe C. Ashwood & Cassandra Handan-Nader, The False Promise of
Simple Information Disclosure: New Evidence on Restaurant Hygiene Grading 4 (Stan. Inst. for
Econ.
Pol’y
Res.,
Working
Paper
No.
17-043,
Dec.
20,
2017),
https://siepr.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/publications/17-043.pdf
[https://perma.cc/TM6KH3XT] (“These data lead to a simple conclusion: there is no evidence that LA’s grading system
reduced foodborne illness.”).
193. See Colleen Honigsberg, Hedge Fund Regulation and Fund Governance: Evidence on the
Effects of Mandatory Disclosure Rules, 57 J. ACCT. RES. 845, 884 (2019) (“My findings provide
evidence that the mandatory disclosure requirements led funds to make changes in their internal
governance . . . .”); see also Hans B. Christensen et al., The Real Effects of Mandated Information
on Social Responsibility in Financial Reports: Evidence from Mine-Safety Records, 64 J. ACCT. &
ECON. 284, 290 (2017) (“Overall, the evidence in this section indicates that compliance with the
Mine Act increased in response to MSD.”); Nico Lehmann, Do Corporate Governance Analysts
Matter? Evidence from the Expansion of Governance Analyst Coverage, 57 J. ACCT. RES. 721, 754
(2018) (“The results indicate that the initiation of ISS coverage causes firm-level improvements in
governance quality, liquidity, financial analyst following, and investor breadth.”).
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D. Private Actors
Finally, Auditor Scorecards are most likely to be effective if
developed by private actors. As noted previously, there are concerns
that regulatory oversight is likely to be suboptimal due to limitations
such as regulatory capture and lobbying. Rather than risk the
Scorecard be implemented in a suboptimal fashion (or not at all),
private actors could use the business model of proxy advisors to develop
and sell the information.
There is one additional benefit to having private actors develop
the Scorecard: these actors could serve as a counterweight to the
influence of accounting firms. One reason that accounting firms are
likely successful when lobbying to prevent disclosures is that there is
not a comparable actor arguing in favor of these disclosures. With
private actors running the Scorecard—and therefore using the
disclosures and reaping the financial success—they would have
incentives to counteract the accounting firms and demand additional
disclosures that they believe would improve the accuracy of the
Scorecard.
CONCLUSION
Despite prior efforts by lawmakers and corporate fiduciaries,
there remains reason to doubt that auditors have sufficient incentive to
perform consistent, high-quality audits. Indeed, PCAOB inspections
from 2005 through 2016 find that, on average, 25% of audits inspected
were severely deficient. To induce higher audit quality, I propose to
create a reputation market for individual auditors.
This approach would have four benefits. First, individual
accountability would increase the audit partner’s costs of audit failure,
thus better aligning the incentives of the audit partner with those of the
shareholders. Second, increased accountability could mitigate the
increased audit risk associated with the use of overseas auditors. Third,
with more information on the individual auditor, market participants
would be able to select higher-quality auditors. Finally, individual
accountability would plausibly increase competition in the accounting
industry.
To achieve a reputation market for individual auditors, I propose
the creation of Auditor Scorecards providing detailed information on
each audit partner. Although the information already publicly available
could provide a noisy signal of audit partner quality, the Scorecard
would be more effective if regulators disclosed additional information.
In particular, PCAOB disciplinary proceedings should be made publicly
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available, more detail on the oversight of overseas auditors should be
provided, and the auditor at fault should be named in regulatory
enforcement actions. These sources of information would provide
ongoing and valuable information regarding each partner’s quality.
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APPENDIX A: PCAOB ANNUAL REPORT DATA
Inspection Year

Percent Not Sufficient Audits

Number of Audits Inspected

2005

31%

988

2006

20%

1080

2007

14%

1035

2008

16%

897

2009

19%

1080

2010

31%

950

2011

30%

825

2012

30%

910

2013

33%

865

2014

25%

780

2015

29%

810

2016

23%

780

This table presents data compiled from PCAOB Inspection Reports covering the
years from 2005 through 2016. The “Percent Not Sufficient Audits” column
represents the percentage of audit opinions the PCAOB believed should not have
been issued because the audit itself was so poorly performed that the auditor did
not have sufficient basis on which to issue an opinion. This percentage is calculated
as the total number of “Not Sufficient” audits divided by the number of audits
inspected by the PCAOB. The “Number of Audits Inspected” category represents
the number of audits inspected annually by the PCAOB (note that the PCAOB
frequently inspects only a portion of these audits, not the entire audit). The
statistical analysis underlying these data are on file with the author, and are based
on PCAOB Inspection Reports available at PUB. COMPANY ACCT. OVERSIGHT BD.,
FIRM INSPECTION REPORTS,
https://pcaobus.org/Inspections/Reports/Pages/
default.aspx (last visited Nov. 5, 2019).

